A Security Architecture for Tenet
Scheme 2

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Abstract

This report proposes a security architecture for Tenet Scheme 2. The basic ideas are (1) to use Internet layer security protocols, such as the IP Security Protocol (IPSP) and Internet Key Management Protocol (IKMP), to establish authentic communication channels between RCAP daemons, (2) to handle client authentication and authorization locally, and (3) to use a proxy-based mechanism to propagate access rights. The security architecture uses as its building blocks a collision-resistant one-way hash function to compute and verify message authentication codes, and a digital signature system.
1 Introduction

The Tenet Group at the University of California and the International Computer Science Institute (ICSI) in Berkeley has been working since 1988 to provide practical solutions to the problem of realtime communications [1, 2]. The initial goal of the work was to devise and specify a set of algorithms that, when implemented in a network, would enable the network to offer a realtime communication service to its clients. Such a set of algorithms was called a realtime communication scheme, or a scheme for brevity. Meanwhile, Tenet Scheme 1 has been embodied in a suite of realtime protocols, namely the Tenet Suite 1\(^1\). In this protocol suite, the task of channel setup is performed by the Real Time Channel Administration Protocol (RCAP). RCAP is a control protocol that takes client requests containing traffic descriptions and performance requirements and sets up realtime channels accordingly. The data transfers are done by the Realtime Internet Protocol (RTIP) which schedules datagrams according to the resource reservations made by RCAP. At the transport layer, the Tenet Suite consists of two protocols: The Realtime Message Transport Protocol (RMTP), which is intended for message-based realtime transport between endpoints, and the Continuous Media Transport Protocol (CMTP), which offers a stream-based interface and a time-driven mechanisms for applications, such as audio and video transmission. The protocol that controls data transfers, primarily reacting to the detection of error conditions, is called the Realtime Control Message Protocol (RTCMP). RTCMP performs functions similar to those of ICMP in the Internet protocol suite.

Today, the Tenet Group is working on Scheme 2. The main focus of this work is to extend the basic realtime communication service provided by Tenet Suite 1 in two respects: To provide abstractions and techniques for efficient multi-party realtime communication, and to make the client-service interface more flexible [3, 4, 5]. In Tenet Scheme 2, the key networking abstraction is the target set, which is similar to the host group in IP multicast [6, 7]. Receivers join a target set depending on their interest in a certain transmission, and channels are established from data sources to the members of the target set accordingly. Join and leave primitives support dynamic membership in target sets, as well as the associated change in multicast channels. From the security point of view, the fact that RCAP uses TCP/IP connections to exchange messages between clients and RCAP daemons should be considered with care. In particular, the use of the TCP/IP protocols does neither allow RCAP daemons to authenticate client requests, nor to protect the authenticity and integrity of messages in exchange. As a matter of fact, the TCP/IP protocols are known to be vulnerable and exposed to various attacks [8, 9], and it is only due to the emerging use of the Internet for commercial purposes that TCP/IP security has quite recently become an issue [10].

This report proposes a security architecture for Tenet Scheme 2. The basic ideas

\(^1\)Compare URL http://tenet.berkeley.edu/tenet-software.html.
are (1) to use Internet layer security protocols, such as the IP Security Protocol (IPSP) and Internet Key Management Protocol (IKMP), to establish authentic communication channels between RCAP daemons, (2) to handle client authentication and authorization locally, and (3) to use a proxy-based mechanism to propagate access rights. The security architecture uses as its building blocks a collision-resistant one-way hash function to compute and verify message authentication codes, and a digital signature system. The rest of this report proceeds as follows: The terminology that is used in this report is introduced in section two. The evolving protocol standards that can be used to provide Internet layer security are overviewed in section three, and the security architecture for Tenet Scheme 2 is described and fully discussed in section four. Conclusions are drawn in section five.

2 Terminology

In general, a principal refers to a human user or system entity that is registered in and authenticatable to a system. Authentication then refers to the process of verifying the claimed identity of a principal, authorization to the process of determining the (access) rights of this principal, and access control to the process of enforcing these access rights. With regard to Tenet Scheme 2, users, clients, and RCAP daemons are considered as principals, and access must be controlled with regard to target sets and channels.

In this report, the following notation is used to refer to users, clients, RCAP daemons, target sets, and channels:

- $U_i$ is used to refer to user $i (i \geq 1)$.
- Every user $U_i$ may have several clients running on his behalf, and $C_{ij}$ is used to refer to client $j$ of user $U_i (i, j \geq 1)$.
- $D_i$ is used to refer to RCAP daemon $i (i \geq 1)$.
- $TS_i$ is used to refer to target set $i (i \geq 1)$.
- Every target set $TS_i$ may have several channels associated with it, and $Ch_{ij}$ is used to refer to channel $j$ of target set $TS_i (i, j \geq 1)$.

A protocol specifies the format and relative timing of messages exchanged between communicating parties. A cryptographic protocol is a protocol that uses cryptographic techniques, meaning that all or parts of the messages are encrypted on the sender’s side, and decrypted on the receiver’s side. Both the Internet layer security protocols and the protocols that are used for client authentication, authorization, and access rights propagation represent cryptographic protocols. The reader of this report is thus assumed to be familiar with cryptology, and the use of cryptographic protocols in computer networks and distributed systems [11]. The following notation is used in this report to describe cryptographic protocols:
• $K$ is used to refer to a secret key, and the term $\{m\}K$ is used to refer to a message $m$ that is encrypted with this key. The same key is used for decryption, so $\{\{m\}K\}K$ equals $m$. If $K$ is used to compute a message authentication code (MAC), then the term $\langle m \rangle K$ is used to refer to a MAC computed for the message $m$ with key $K$. An efficient way to compute and verify a MAC is to use a collision-resistant one-way hash function, such as MD4 [12], MD5 [13] or the Secure Hash Standard (SHS) [14], and to key it with a secret key [15, 16].

• $(k, k^{-1})$ is used to refer to a public key pair, with $k$ being the public key, and $k^{-1}$ being the corresponding private key. The term $\{m\}k$ is used to refer to a message $m$ that is encrypted with a public key $k$. The message can be decrypted only with the corresponding private key $k^{-1}$. In a digital signature system, such as RSA [17], ElGamal [18], or the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) proposed by the NIST [19], the user’s private key is used to digitally sign messages, whereas the corresponding public key is used to verify the signatures. In this case, the term $\{m\}k^{-1}$ is used to refer to a digital signature giving message recovery, and the term $\langle m \rangle k^{-1}$ is used to refer to a digital signature with appendix [20]. In the latter case, $\langle m \rangle k^{-1}$ abbreviates $m, \{h(m)\}k^{-1}$, with $h$ being a collision-resistant one-way hash function.

In either case, key subscripts may be used to indicate principals, target sets, or channels.

3 Internet Layer Security Protocols

With regard to the Internet’s security concerns, both the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) and the the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) have launched corresponding activities. The IRTF Privacy and Security Research Group (PSRG) is adapting the OSI security architecture [20] for the Internet, and the IETF has chartered an Internet Protocol Security Protocol (IPSEC) Working Group (WG) to standardize Internet layer security protocols. The IETF IPSEC WG seeks to standardize an IP Security Protocol (IPSP) and a corresponding Internet Key Management Protocol (IKMP).

3.1 IPSP

The idea of having a standardized network layer security protocol is not new, and several proposals had been made before the IPSEC WG even started to meet: The Security Protocol 3 (SP3) was proposed by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) as part of the Secure Data Network System (SDNS); the Network Layer Security Protocol (NLS) was proposed by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) to secure the Connectionless Network Protocol (CLNP); the Integrated NLSP (I-NLSP) was proposed to
provide security services for both IP and CLNP; and swIPe was yet another protocol proposal.

In spite of their different names and specifications, all of these protocols have one thing in common; they all use IP encapsulation as their enabling technique. IP encapsulation allows IP datagrams to be encrypted and enclosed in outer IP headers. Based on these outer IP headers, the datagrams are then routed through an internet. At a peer systems, the outer IP headers are stripped off, and the IP datagrams are decrypted and forwarded to their final destinations. The current version of IPSP is based on IP encapsulation, too [21]. As a matter of fact, it suggests the use of two security mechanisms that may be used together or separately:

- The Authentication Header (AH) provides data origin authentication services for IPSP datagrams. In essence, the sender of a datagram computes a MAC over the constant parts of the datagram, and sends the result as AH together with the datagram to the receiver. The receiver extracts the AH, recalculates the MAC, and verifies, whether the value matches the AH that he has received from the sender.

- The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) uses IP encapsulation to protect the data confidentiality of IPSP datagrams.

The IETF IPSEC WG has proposed keyed MD5 [13] as a default algorithm for the AH mechanism, and the Data Encryption Standard (DES) in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode [22, 23] for the ESP mechanism. However, export, import and use of encryption may be regulated in some countries, and other algorithms and modes may be implemented, too.

3.2 IKMP

With regard to a possible IKMP standard, several proposals have been submitted to the IETF IPSEC WG for further consideration:

- The Modular Key Management Protocol (MKMP) uses long-term master keys to derive short-term session keys that provide perfect forward secrecy [24].

- The Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) uses implicitly shared long-term Diffie-Hellman keys to derive keys on a per-session or per-datatype basis [25].

- The Photuris² Key Management Protocol combines a Diffie-Hellman key exchange with a subsequent exchange of RSA signatures.

²"Photuris" is the latin name for the firefly, and "Firefly" is in turn the name for a classified key exchange protocol designed by the NSA for the STU-III secure telephone.
Quite recently, the Internet Drafts related to the IPSP have been approved by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG) as Proposed Standards for the Internet. With regard to the IKMP, the focus of the IETF IPSEC WG is currently on the Photuris proposal.

4 Security Architecture

It has already been mentioned that the basic ideas of the security architecture for Tenet Scheme 2 are to use Internet layer security protocols to establish authentic communication channels between RCAP daemons, to handle client authentication and authorization locally, and to use a proxy-based mechanism to propagate access rights. Having overviewed the Internet layer security protocols that can be used to establish authentic channels between RCAP daemons in section three, it is now up to this section to address the remaining questions, namely how to authenticate and authorize clients locally, and how to propagate access rights. These questions are discussed in the following subsections. The assumptions are as follows:

1. Every RCAP daemon $D_i$ holds a long-term public key pair $(k_{D_i}, k^{-1}_{D_i})$ that can be used in a digital signature system. Note that the public key pair may but need not be the same as the public key pair that is used for IKMP. Also note that the problem of key revocation is considered as being too general as to be necessarily discussed in the context of Tenet Scheme 2.

2. Every user $U_i$ (and thus every client $C_{ij}$ that may act on $U_i$’s behalf) is associated with a particular RCAP daemon $D_k$, and this RCAP daemon is commonly referred to as $U_i$’s (and $C_{ij}$’s) home RCAP daemon.

3. Every RCAP daemon $D_i$ has a list of users who are authorized to have $D_i$ create a target set. The acronym UAL (User Authorization List) is used to refer to this list.

With regard to the last two assumptions it should be made explicit that the notion of a home RCAP daemon has been introduced to avoid the necessity of having and maintaining a global naming scheme. In this case, a RCAP daemon must only know its local users. However, the security architecture as described in this report doesn’t suffer any fundamental change, if home RCAP daemons are either clustered, or made obsolete by introducing a global naming scheme.

4.1 Authentication

If user $U_i$ has one of his clients $C_{ij}$ contact his home RCAP daemon $D_k$, $C_{ij}$ and $D_k$ must authenticate each other. In principle, $C_{ij}$ has to show that he’s acting on $U_i$’s behalf, and $D_k$ has to show that he’s $U_i$’s (and thus $C_{ij}$’s) home RCAP daemon.
There are many authentication protocols available that can be used for this purpose [26]. They all require either a secret to be shared between $U_i$ and $D_k$, or the use of public key cryptography:

- With regard to the first possibility, the secret shared between $U_i$ and $D_k$ may be a personal identification number (PIN), a password, or a secret key. In the first two cases, a single sign-on mechanism may be used to authenticate a user based on a PIN or password that is assumed to be weak, and to provide him with a comparably strong secret key.

- With regard to the second possibility, both $U_i$ and $D_k$ must have a public key pair, of which they keep the private key secret and make the public key available to the others. Note that $D_k$ already fulfills these requirements, as $k_{D_k}^{-1}$ is $D_k$’s private key and $k_{D_k}$ is assumed to be publicly available. Consequently, the problem is only relevant for $U_i$. One possibility to solve the problem is to equip $U_i$ with a personal token that stores $k_{U_i}^{-1}$ his behalf. However, this solution requires the use of special hardware devices, and the cost of this solution may be prohibitive. A more realistic approach is either to locally store $k_{U_i}^{-1}$ encrypted with a password-derived key encryption key, or to have $D_k$ store $k_{U_i}^{-1}$, and to use a password-based mechanism to control access to the key.

Also note that some operating systems offer a possibility that, in principle, would allow RCAP daemons to authenticate users without having to store additional authentication information. For example, if $D_k$ had read access to the password file of a UNIX system, the entries of this file could be used to authenticate users. Taking advantage of this possibility may simplify authentication. However, it is only fair to mention that it also exposes the users’ passwords to malicious software attacks from the RCAP daemon’s side. One way to deal with this problem is to have the RCAP daemon authenticate to a client, before the client requests and delivers the user’s password.

Having discussed the various approaches for authentication, it is assumed that a corresponding protocol is used, and that this protocol provides $C_{ij}$ and $D_k$ with a strong session key $K_{ik}$ that can be used for the lifetime of a session to authenticate the origin of messages.

### 4.2 Authorization and Access Control

To create a target set $TS_i$ on $U_i$’s behalf, $C_{ij}$ has to randomly select a public key pair $(k_i, k_i^{-1})$ for $TS_i$, and request $D_k$ to create $TS_i$ by using the following protocol:

1. $C_{ij} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Target\_Set\_Create\_Request}(\langle TS_i, k_i \rangle K_{ik})$
2. $D_k \rightarrow C_{ij} : \text{Target\_Set\_Create\_Confirmation}(\{TS_i, k_i \} k_{D_k}^{-1})$
In step 1, $C_{ij}$ sends a target set create request to $D_k$. The message includes $TS_i$ and $k_i$, as well as a MAC to protect the message origin's authenticity. $C_{ij}$ uses $K_{ik}$ to compute the MAC, and $D_k$ uses the same key to verify it. If the MAC is valid, $D_k$ assumes the request to be authentic. If $U_i$ is enumerated in $D_k$’s UAL, $D_k$ creates the target set, and returns a target set create confirmation to $C_{ij}$ in step 2. Note that the message in this case represents a digital signature for $TS_i$ and $k_i$, generated with $D_k$’s private key $k_{D_k}^{-1}$. $D_j$ and $C_{ik}$ both store the confirmation for backup purposes, and $C_{ik}$ announces $TS_i$, $k_i$, $C_{ij}$, $D_k$, and $\{TS_i, k_i\} k_{D_k}^{-1}$ in public.

If a client $C_{xy}$ is to perform a specific operation on $TS_i$, such as join or leave, or create a channel on $TS_i$, he must be authorized accordingly. In principle, he must be granted a proxy that provides him with the corresponding (access) rights by $C_{ij}$. Therefore, $C_{xy}$ randomly selects a public key pair $(k, k^{-1})$, and uses the following protocol to request the proxy:

1: $C_{xy} \rightarrow C_{ij} : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Request}(TS_i, \{R, C_{xy}, k\} k_i)$
2: $C_{ij} \rightarrow C_{xy} : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Confirmation}(TS_i, \{R', C_{xy}, k\} k_i^{-1})$

In step 1, $C_{xy}$ sends a target set proxy request to $C_{ij}$. The message includes $TS_i$, an encoded set $R$ of requested access rights, $C_{xy}$, and the public key $k$. $R$, $C_{xy}$, and $k$ are encrypted with $k_i$, the public key of the target set. After having received the request, $C_{ij}$ decrypts the encrypted part with $k_i^{-1}$, and decides whether he wants to grant access rights to $C_{xy}$. If he does, he selects a set $R'$ of access rights, and returns a corresponding target set proxy confirmation to $C_{xy}$ in step 2. The message includes $TS_i$, $R'$, $C_{xy}$, and $k$, with the last three components being digitally signed with $k_i^{-1}$.

Note that, in general, $C_{xy}$ and $C_{ij}$ needn’t be associated with the same RCAP daemon. If $U_x$ and $C_{xy}$ are associated with $D_z$, and $U_i$ and $C_{ij}$ with $D_k$, then the target set proxy request and confirmation must be passed along a path between $D_z$ and $D_k$, and this path may include several RCAP daemons. The messages that are exchanged between RCAP daemons, however, are assumed to be protected by using the IPSP AH mechanism. Provided that an IPSP connection can be established between $D_z$ and $D_k$ the protocol to request a target set proxy is as follows:

1: $C_{xy} \rightarrow D_z : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Request}(\{TS_i, \{R, C_{xy}, k\} k_i\} K_{xz})$
2: $D_z \rightarrow D_k : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Request}(\{TS_i, \{R, C_{xy}, k\} k_i\})$
3: $D_k \rightarrow C_{ij} : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Request}(\{TS_i, \{R, C_{xy}, k\} k_i\} K_{ik})$
4: $C_{ij} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Confirmation}(\{TS_i, \{R', C_{xy}, k\} k_i^{-1}\} K_{ik})$
5: $D_k \rightarrow D_z : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Confirmation}(\{TS_i, \{R', C_{xy}, k\} k_i^{-1}\})$
6: $D_z \rightarrow C_{xy} : \text{Target.Set.Proxy.Confirmation}(\{TS_i, \{R', C_{xy}, k\} k_i^{-1}\} K_{xz})$

The target set proxy request is passed from $C_{xy}$ to $D_z$ in step 1, from $D_z$ to $D_k$ in step 2, and from $D_k$ to $C_{ij}$ in step 3. In return, the target set proxy confirmation is passed from $C_{ij}$ to $D_k$ in step 4, from $D_k$ to $D_z$ in step 5, and from $D_z$ back to $C_{xy}$ in step 6. The authenticity of the messages that are exchanged between clients and
RCAP daemons are protected by MACs, and the authenticity of the messages that are exchanged between RCAP daemons are protected by the IPSP AH mechanism. The latter protection mechanism is indicated by using double square brackets in steps 2 and 5.

If \( C_{xy} \) wants to use the proxy that he has been granted by \( C_{ij} \), he contacts \( D_k \) with the following challenge-response protocol:

1: \( C_{xy} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Target\_Set\_Access\_Request}(TS_i, C_{xy}, \{R', C_{xy}, k\}k_i^{-1}) \)
2: \( D_k \rightarrow C_{xy} : \text{Target\_Set\_Access\_Request\_Challenge}(N) \)
3: \( C_{xy} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Target\_Set\_Access\_Request\_Response}(\{N\}k^{-1}) \)

Note that the protocol is given in its short form, without going through all intermediate RCAP daemons between \( C_{xy} \) and \( D_k \). In step 1, \( C_{xy} \) provides \( D_k \) with \( TS_i, C_{xy} \), and the digitally signed part of the target set proxy that he has received from \( C_{ij} \) for \( TS_i \). \( D_k \) can compare the client information in the request with the client information in \( C_{ij} \)'s confirmation. If they match, \( D_k \) assumes the access request to be valid. He challenges \( C_{xy} \) with a fresh nonce \( N \) in step 2, and expects \( C_{xy} \) to answer with a digital signature for \( N \) in step 3. Note that \( C_{xy} \) can generate the correct response only if he holds the private key \( k^{-1} \) that corresponds to \( k \). If \( C_{xy} \) is able to correctly respond with \( \{N\}k^{-1} \), \( D_k \) assumes that the proxy has indeed been issued for \( C_{xy} \).

In Tenet Scheme 2, a target set may have several channels associated with it, and the right to create a channel on a target set must be granted by the owner of the target set. Consequently, if \( C_{ij} \) is the owner of target set \( TS_i \), \( C_{xy} \) has to be granted a proxy to create a channel \( Ch_{lk} \) on \( TS_i \) by \( C_{ij} \). If \( C_{ij} \) provides \( C_{xy} \) with such a proxy, \( C_{xy} \) can use it to have \( D_k \) set up \( Ch_{lk} \). In this case, \( D_k \) registers \( C_{xy} \) with the public key \( k' \) as owner of the channel. If another client \( C_{vw} \) then wants to access channel \( Ch_{lk} \), he has been provided with a proxy by \( C_{xy} \). In this case, \( C_{xy} \) uses \( k'^{-1} \) to issue and digitally sign proxies for \( Ch_{lk} \). The protocol to request a proxy for a channel is similar to the protocol to request a proxy for a target set. In this case, \( C_{vw} \) randomly selects a public key pair \( (k'', k''^{-1}) \), and uses the following protocol:

1: \( C_{vw} \rightarrow C_{xy} : \text{Channel\_Proxy\_Request}(Ch_{lk}, \{R, C_{vw}, k''\}k') \)
2: \( C_{xy} \rightarrow C_{vw} : \text{Channel\_Proxy\_Confirmation}(Ch_{lk}, \{R', C_{vw}, k''\}k'^{-1}) \)

Again, the connection between \( C_{vw} \) and \( C_{xy} \) may lead through intermediate RCAP daemons, and to keep the description simple, the protocol is given in its short form. After being granted a proxy to access \( Ch_{lk} \), \( C_{vw} \) can use the following protocol to use it:

1: \( C_{vw} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Channel\_Access\_Request}(Ch_{lk}, C_{vw}, \{R', C_{vw}, k\}k'^{-1}) \)
2: \( D_k \rightarrow C_{vw} : \text{Channel\_Access\_Request\_Challenge}(N) \)
3: \( C_{vw} \rightarrow D_k : \text{Channel\_Access\_Request\_Response}(\{N\}k'^{-1}) \)
This protocol is analogue to the protocol that is used to use target set proxies.

The proxy-based authorization mechanism described in this report is similar to the restricted proxies proposed in [27]. Both mechanisms use a certificate that carries a public key, and a corresponding private key that links the proxy to its owner. The main difference between the two mechanisms is related to the way in which the private key is selected and distributed. Whereas in the mechanism described in this report, the client that requests a proxy selects a public key pair and has the public key digitally signed by the proxy grantor, it is the grantor that selects a public key pair and provides the client with both the certificate and the corresponding private key in [27]. It is assumed that the mechanism described in this report is advantageous in situations that can't assume secret channels to be available between clients, as well as in situations in which non-repudiation is a topic. Note that if the proxy grantor selects the client's private key, there is, in general, no possibility to provide non-repudiation. On the other hand, it is assumed that in situations that require a distribution of many proxies to various clients, the mechanism proposed in [27] has scalability advantages. It is, in general, more convenient for a client to be provided with the proxies he needs, instead of having to request them. Both mechanisms need further investigation. In fact, the mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and both mechanisms could be used in Tenet Scheme 2. For example, one possibility would be to use the mechanism proposed in [27] to distribute bearer proxies that can be used by anyone, and to use the mechanism described in this report to distribute delegate proxies that can be used only by the clients they name.

5 Conclusions

This report has proposed a security architecture for Tenet Scheme 2. The basic ideas are (1) to use Internet layer security protocols, such as the IP Security Protocol (IPSP) and Internet Key Management Protocol (IKMP), to establish authentic communication channels between RCAP daemons, (2) to handle client authentication and authorization locally, and (3) to use a proxy-based mechanism to propagate access rights. The security architecture uses as its building blocks a collision-resistant one-way hash function to compute and verify message authentication codes, and a digital signature system. Note that none of these ideas is directly coupled to the internals of Tenet Scheme 2. It is thus assumed that the security architecture as proposed in this report may be adapted to other resource reservation schemes, too. Also note that the security architecture uses as its building blocks a collision-resistant one-way hash function that can be used to compute and verify message authentication codes, and a digital signature system. Neither one-way hash functions nor digital signature systems are subject to stringent U.S. export restriction, and it is assumed that an implementation of the security architecture would be exportable from the U.S.
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References


