Cognitive Science 108/ Linguistics 108
The Challenge of Cognitive Science to Western Philosophy
Readings
(in Philosophy in the Flesh)Reading for Tuesday, October 5, 1999: Read Chapter 13.
Homework 6
Due at the Beginning of Class Tuesday, October 5, 1999.
Ground Rules: Discuss the homework with the members of your group. No group notes are to be taken. Write up your homeworks individually. They should be in 12 point type, either 1 & 1/2 spaced or double spaced, with at least 1 inch margins. No late homeworks.
This homework is on the course website: http://www.icsi.berkeley.edu/~bbergen/cs108/index.html
We suggest the following: Go to the website and download a copy of the homework. Copy the questions into a new file, and fill in your answers after each question, using a different font (e.g., put the questions in italics and the answers in roman). This way it will be clearer to the grader which answer goes with which question, and you will have an overview of all your answers to questions, one by one, at the end of the course.
Chapter 12
a. This argument has a hidden assumption.
Preoccupation with language has been a distinctive feature of twentieth-century philosophy . What is new is the study of language in order to achieve results on other subjects mind, morals, nature, even God. The idea is that language can be made to yield truths about such subjects, or at least solutions to problems concerning them, as well as about itself.
-V.C. Chappelle, Ordinary Language, p. 1
At any rate, I have one answer to the question of why language matters to philosophy now. It matters for the reason that ideas mattered in seventeenth-century philosophy, because ideas then, and sentences now, serve as the interface between the knowing subject and what is known. The sentence matters even more if we begin to dispense with the fiction of a knowing subject, and regard discourse as autonomous. Language matters to philosophy because of what knowledge has become. Discourse [is] that which constitutes human knowledge.
-Ian Hacking, Why Does Language Matter To Philosophy, p. 187.
Discuss briefly how the metaphorical entailments on pp. 248-249 relate to these beliefs about the nature of philosophy. (Which metaphors and specifically which entailments give rise to the beliefs?)
In Searle's "analogy" between himself and a computer, these aspects of Searle's mind do not map onto the computer at all:
Yet, Searle argues that the fact that he does not understand Chinese (in the argument) proves that the computer does not understand Chinese. That is, he is arguing that a fact about his mind (it's lack of understanding of Chinese) proves a "corresponding" fact about the computer (it doesn't understand Chinese).
Is there a problem with Searle's argument? If so, say what it is. If not, say why not.