Claiming your territory: discourse strategies in Japanese

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Abstract

The field of Japanese modality has received a large amount of attention over the past several decades. In particular, the class of works commonly known as sentence-final particles (SFPs) has been of interest to a wide range of researchers. However, despite years of work a consistent analysis of SFPs and related aspects of Japanese modality has yet to emerge. This problem is compounded further by the unfortunate inaccessibility of a large portion of work done by native grammarians and other scholars in Japan.

This thesis has two main objectives. The first is to provide critical summaries of the work of several prominent researchers in the area of Japanese evidentiality. In particular, I will critically examine the most recent work done in the field of "territory of information," including the most recent framework in the field and several prominent criticisms of the program. The second objective is to present a model of some Japanese sentence-final particles that are generally believed to index evidentiality. The model proposed incorporates and expands upon the findings in the literature. I will propose a distinction made by speakers between information that they *expect* others to be aware of and information that they actually *are* aware of. Based on this distinction, as well as the concept of "territory," a wide range of Japanese modals will be accounted for.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

A tremendous amount of time has been spent examining the socio-pragmatic properties of the Japanese language, and for good reason. In Japanese, every utterance necessarily indexes not only interlocutors' social relationship, but also their attitudinal stances towards the speech situation and to the content of the utterance itself (Matsumoto 1988). Among the linguistic phenomena commonly studied are politeness/distance verbal suffixes such as -*mas*-, honorific and humble forms, both lexical (*mesiagar*- 'eat') and phrasal (*go*-[Verb]-*ni nar*- 'to [verb]'), root and evidential modals (*hazu* 'ought,' *daroo*, 'maybe'), and the so-called sentence-final particles (SFPs) like *yo*, *ne*, and *wa*. A descriptive typology of many of these is given by Aoki (1986), though deeper investigations clearly reveal that the semantics and pragmatics of many of these linguistic forms goes far beyond the descriptive capabilities of standard analyses.

Traditionally, these lexical items have been grouped into functional classes. Thus, there are those that clearly index the social relationship between the speaker and either the hearer or a referent in the discourse, those that indicate evidentiality or other similar modalities, and those that index the speaker's stance[1] towards the content of the information being uttered. The final group consists of particles, most notably *yo* and *ne*, which occur sentence-finally, and are thus commonly called sentence-final particles (SFPs). These SFPs occur with a very high frequency in spoken discourse and their proper use is crucial in fluent speech.

SFPs have received much attention by both native and non-native scholars of Japanese, not only because of their peculiar social function, but because their exact distributions have proven elusive. Characterizations often given to learners of Japanese include the following

[1] That is, an interlocutor's attitude, feeling, or judgement concerning the propositional content of an utterance.

(from Makino & Tsutsui 1986):

(1.1) a. *ne*: a sentence-final particle that indicates the speaker's request for confirmation or agreement from the hearer about some shared knowledge.

b. *yo*: a sentence-final particle that indicates the speaker's (fairly) strong conviction or assertion about s.t. that is assumed to be known only to him.

However, these simplistic characterizations are commonly observed to fail when applied to the entire range of attested uses (Maynard 1993). Furthermore, without placing these characterizations within a larger framework of pragmatics and discourse theory, characterizations such as these would remain only textbook generalizations; the relationship between SFPs and other well-known pragmatic phenomena would remain untestable.

A first attempt at a more integrated characterization of Japanese SFPs was given by Kamio (1979), where he introduced the cognitive entity *territory of information* to explain the distribution of certain sentence-final particles. This work was later further developed and augmented, though the basic intuitions remained the same throughout—speakers view certain types of information as "theirs" and other types as not theirs, and mark their utterances to indicate their stance regarding the information being communicated. Kamio's analyses revitalized the study of SFPs, and throughout the following decades a large amount of literature was produced regarding these and related phenomena.

Unfortunately, however, a consensus on the nature of even one of these particles has not yet been reached, though certainly advances have been made. Cook (1990) has characterized *ne* and *yo* with relation to *affective common ground.* Maynard (1993) develops a model of Discourse Modality within which she provides descriptions of a large range of pragmatic phenomena, including discourse connectives, modal adverbs, and "interactional particles" *ne* and *yo* (Maynard 1993:183-220). Kinsui and Takubo (Kinsui 1992 and Takubo & Kinsui 1997, 2000) posit a Mental Spaces-type model of Discourse Management that attempts to account for a range of phenomena including demonstratives, personal pronouns, some evidentials, and finally *yo* and *ne.* Rudolph (1993) introduces the concept of information as a social resource, with social roles that are licensed to access or transfer certain types of information, claiming that SFPs *ne*, *yo*, and (unique to her work) *no* stand in a paradigmatic relationship regarding the indexing of social stance towards uttered information. Finally, Trent (1997) attempts to give an account of a wider range of Japanese sentence-final forms (SFFs, i.e., the traditional SFPs in addition to a small set of evidentials: *daroo* 'maybe,' *rasii* 'appears, seems,' *yoo da* 'appears, seems,' *soo da* 'I heard,' *tte* 'I heard') as observed in a large spoken corpus by extending Kamio's (1994) theory. It should be clear that between

these works, a large amount of data is covered, ranging from conventions in entity reference to modal adverbs. Why, then, should each of these authors have decided that SFPs belong within the scope of their respective models?

It seems to me that there are some fundamental differences in assumptions that various researchers have made when confronting these sentence-final forms. These differences can be expressed by asking how they would answer questions like the following:

(1.2) a. When SFPs (like *ne*) are used, are they used because they are required? If so, is the requirement semantic, or pragmatic? If not, what is the motivation and pragmatic effect of their use? Or, are there some cases where they are required and others where they are not?

b. Should the characterization of SFPs be primarily social or cognitive?[2]

c. Do SFPs *reflect* or *change* the social (or cognitive) relationship between the interlocutors and their territorial stances towards the information uttered? In other words, can their uses be strategic?

Each of the authors of the works cited above would, I believe, give rather different answers to each of these questions. I will return to this issue in Section 3.3.

The issue is further complicated by several facts. First, aside from Kamio's theory of territory of information, there is a very small amount of attention to parallel research among the above-cited authors (at least as indicated by a paucity of inter-author citations); further, even Kamio has often either ignored or been unaware of major work done in the study of SFPs, and has updated his theory several times without visible incorporation of others' findings. Of course, this also means that many criticisms of Kamio's early work are invalid when applied to later versions of the territory of information model, although some have influenced Kamio's work directly. Finally, with the exception of Trent 1997, there has been an extremely low level of awareness among U.S. authors regarding similar research being carried out in Japan by native and western-trained linguists (Takubo & Kinsui 1997 remains, as far as I am aware, the only summary of the work of Japanese linguists published in English in a refereed journal) Clearly, before an account of Japanese SFPs can be created which is consistent with all of the findings of the above-cited authors (or indeed before it can be

[2]I borrow Trent's (1997) term "cognitive," defined in opposition to "social" or "interactional," to essentially refer to conception of pragmatic particles that claims they are not interactional or social in nature, but instead index some mental state of the speaker as some verb affix might "index," or agree with an argument of the verb.

determined that such a task is even possible) the considerable literature produced in Japan must be carefully considered.

In this thesis, I will consider a wide range of linguistic data as it has been analyzed by several researchers with widely differing viewpoints on the subject of modality and discourse. Then, keeping in mind the substantive findings of these researchers, I will present an integrated account of Japanese modality, focusing in particular on sentence-final particles, though also including evidentiality. The starting point will be the speaker located in a conversational interaction, with specific informational and interactional goals. Speakers are known to use a variety of strategies in order to accomplish communicative and interactional goals, such as in the mitigation of face-threatening acts (Brown & Levinson 1987). Speakers are also known to carry a wide range of presuppositions and assumptions about their conversational partners. I will attempt to demonstrate that beyond politeness, speakers can make use of evidentiality, and more widely modality, to index aspects of these assumptions, and in so doing indirectly index their stance towards the information they utter and the addressees with whom they interact.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2, I will provide an overview of the development of Kamio's theory of territory of information and give a summary of the most recent version of the theory (Kamio 1997, 1998, 2002). Chapter 3 will detail some of the major criticisms leveled against his claims and address the general adequacy of territory-type models. Chapter 4 will outline briefly an alternative account of Japanese sentence-final particles based on a socio-pragmatic model of discourse. In Chapter 5 I will present an integrated approach to modality that takes into account some uses of SFPs, particularly *ne*, that consistently seem to elude other models. Finally, I conclude with a view towards future possibilities for investigation.

Chapter 2

Territory of Information

Speakers intuitively feel that certain facts are essentially theirs, and certain other facts are not. For instance, a speaker would tend to view facts about her birthplace, food likes and dislikes, and personal property view as her own, whereas facts about others' birthplaces and food preferences, as well as obscure knowledge like the inner workings of biological systems as *not* her own. On a more physical level, people (and animals in general) view the immediate space surrounding them to be "their own," and act towards entities within their space, or territory, differently than towards entities outside that space (Kamio 1997:1).

Starting with the idea of physical territories, Akio Kamio has, over decades of work, developed a theory that attempts to model and explain long-unsolved issues in Japanese discourse by appealing to a cognitive-linguistic corollary to territoriality (Kamio 1990, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2002, and Kamio & Takami 1998). He notes several informal attempts to refer to some nebulous concept of speaker's or hearer's territory, particularly in the realms of evidentiality, politeness, and (in the case of Japanese) demonstratives (see Kamio (1997:1-2) for references), and determines that a more rigorous characterization of the concept of "speaker's territory" is required. His major works advance a systematic framework of territoriality, and relate them not only to the aforementioned fields but also to the class of sentence-final particles, which as mentioned above, Japanese grammarians had been puzzling over for decades.

It is important to note at the outset what Kamio takes as his starting point in terms of linguistic analysis. In most of his works, and especially so in the earlier versions of the theory, Kamio nearly exclusively examines two aspects of Japanese utterances—the sentence-final particle *ne* and those other sentence-final forms normally labeled "evidentials." The latter include, for Kamio, hearsay markers like *tte* and *soo da* ('I hear'), the hedge *daroo* ('probably'), and core evidentials *rasii* ('seem') and *yoo da* ('appear'). See Aoki (1986) for

a traditional treatment of all of these SFPs, as well as other forms, as evidentials.

Although there is a cottage industry dedicated to separating the various evidentials into their respective uses, Kamio does not take this into consideration in his work. He conceives of two major axes along which Japanese sentences can vary:

(2.1) a. Indirect and direct, i.e., those with "evidentials" and those without

b. With *ne* and without *ne*

This leads to four potential combinations, and thus four sentence types.[1] All four exist in Japanese, and Kamio takes as his first major goal an explanation of the distribution of these sentence types in Japanese utterances. The framework he uses for this task is a formalization of territoriality.

2.1 An initial attempt

2.1.1 The framework

An extremely basic conception of territoriality, such as the one put forward in Kamio 1990, would have six elements: The speaker, the hearer, the speaker's and hearer's respective territories,[2] some piece of information transmitted in an utterance (informally, the propositional content), and some conditions that must hold for the piece of information to fall within one of the interlocutors' territories. There would then be four possible states:

(2.2) a. The information lies within only the speaker's territory.

b. The information lies within only the hearer's territory.

c. The information lies within both the hearer's and speaker's territories.

d. The information lies within neither the hearer's nor the speaker's territories.

The model also requires a set of conditions that a particular piece of information must meet in order to be considered inside the speaker's (or hearer's) territory. As Kamio conceived of them, they are (Kamio 1990:33):

[1]Kamio for the most part ignores other often-studied SFPs like *yo*, *wa*, *yo ne*, and *no da*. He also does not consider other modality markers like *kamosirenai* 'maybe' and *ni tigainai* 'definitely.'

[2]Some, like Takubo & Kinsui (1997:749,757), contend that the concept of e.g., "hearer's domain" cannot properly be in a model of discourse. Only indirect reference to a hearer's mental states, as through a speaker's model of the hearer, should be possible. Kamio also seems to take this view (Kamio 1998:40), though he does not make explicit his reason for it.

(2.3) a. Information gained by the speaker's direct experience
b. Information that expresses personal facts about the speaker's past life or possessions
c. Information about the speaker's future projects and plans that are certain to happen
d. Information that expresses important personal facts related to the speaker's kin or very close people
e. Information about future projects and plans of the speaker's kin or very close people that are certain to happen
f. Basic information in the speaker's professional field or his/her specialty
g. Information about places with which the speaker is deeply involved
h. Other information with which the speaker is deeply involved in some sense

This basic model is the one presented in Kamio 1990 (also see Akatsuka 1993, Okamoto 1996, and Trent 1997 for discussion of the early model). In this conception, Kamio was able to use territoriality to explain the distribution of two classes of sentence types in Japanese. For the four types in (2.2), (2.2a) and (2.2c) call for an utterance without any evidential forms or hedges, i.e. the direct form; (2.2b) and (2.2d) call for an utterance with one such form, i.e. the indirect form; (2.2b) and (2.2c) call for the sentence-final particle *ne*, and (2.2a) and (2.2d) prohibit the use of *ne*. In general, the predictions made by the model match with the intuitions of native speakers.

2.1.2 Significance of the theory

This work had some major ramifications. First, Kamio was able to demonstrate that in some cases the use of *ne* is obligatory. Before, most scholars of Japanese assumed that *ne* was used as an optional marker that speakers could add on to request confirmation, or to establish rapport by demonstrating recognition of shared information (cf Makino & Tsutsui 1986). The theory of territory of information, on the other hand, predicted that in some cases *ne* would be *obligatory*. For instance:[3,4]

[3]Following Kamio, in this section *ne*, *nee*, *na*, and *naa* are all considered variations on *ne*. Similarly, *daro(o)* and *desyo(o)* are considered to be versions of *daroo*.

[4]The abbreviations used in this thesis are: ACC—accusative, COP—copula, GEN—genetive, HON—honorific, NOM—nominative, nominalizer, PL—plural, QP—question particle, QUOTP—quotative particle, SG—singular, TOP—topic.

(2.4) ii tenki da nee.
good weather COP *ne*
'It's a beautiful day!'

(2.5) A. kono kyoku, ii kyoku daroo.
this song good song *daroo*
'Isn't this song nice?'

B. ee, ii kyoku desu *(ne).
yes good song TOP *ne*
'Yes, it is.'

For (2.4), taken from Kamio (1994:88), a proper situation would be when both the speaker and hearer were sitting in the same location, observing the same weather. The speaker would then, using the conditions laid out in (2.3) would come to the conclusion that the information *ii tenki da* 'it's good weather' falls within both interlocutors' territories, and thus a *direct form* (i.e., no hedges or evidentials) with *ne* is required. If (2.4) were to be uttered without *ne*, a totally different situation would be required; for instance, the case where the speaker is telling someone over the telephone about the local weather. In this case, the hearer does not share any information with the speaker and so *ne* is obligatory. Similarly, in (2.5), partially adapted from Akatsuka (1993:617), just in case A is the composer of the song and both A and B are listening to it, B *must* respond with *ne*, otherwise the sentence becomes highly awkward. These and other examples demonstrate first that in some cases SFPs like *ne* are obligatory, and second that a theory of territory of information can predict their distribution.

Incidentally, it is critical to note that the judgements of utterances, as in (2.5), are to be taken as pragmatic judgements, not judgements of syntactic well-formedness. However, given the context described some sentences, like B's utterance above without *ne*, would be unacceptable or infelicitous. In most cases separate contexts could be imagined where the utterance would be acceptable, though in others (like information about close personal data, see below) it is nearly impossible to find a context in which the utterance could be made naturally.

Some, however, questioned Kamio's methodology (Akatsuka (1993:617), among others), noting the extensive use of constructed examples as opposed to actual conversation data. Additionally, the nature of his list as represented in (2.3) also was not without its critics. Although his analysis of Japanese and English utterances was not perfect, and his methodology had some flaws, his work nevertheless had the value of rejuvenating the ailing study of poorly-understood Japanese sentence-final elements like *soo da*, *rasii*, and *ne*.

2.2 Development of the theory

Subsequent versions of Kamio's theory have differed significantly in implementation from his original proposal. First, an update to his 1990 book, responding to criticisms of his original theory, came in 1994. Second, Kamio extended the theory to handle psychological utterances in both Japanese and English in Kamio (1995). In these two articles, Kamio vastly simplified some parts of his theory by codifying some of the more intuitive parts. He also added complexity in the form of gradient territoriality, which increased the number of sentence types that could be explained by the theory, and created a more intuitive, nuanced explanatory framework. Next, he presented in book form (Kamio 1997) a summary of these two articles as well as extensive discussion of possible additional applications of his theory. Finally, in Kamio 1998 he presented a slight revision to his 1997 book, incorporating a detailed algorithm for determining territoriality. Although there were a few theoretical inconsistencies between his 1997 and 1998 works, in this section I will confine discussion to the more recent 1998 version of the model, noting differences to the earlier works.[5]

The basic idea of a speaker's and hearer's territory remained unchanged from Kamio's original thesis, but he did away with the original binary inside/outside distinction in favor of a more graded scale. Kamio (1994) introduced a graphical representation of territory as follows:

(2.6)
```
Speaker |------|---------|------|
        1      i         n      0
```

The speaker's territory is represented as a "linear psychological scale" (Kamio 1997:16) with values ranging from 1 (completely within the speaker's territory) to 0 (completely outside the speaker's territory) inclusive. In the representation above, i represents the location of the information on the territorial scale, and n represents the cut-off point of the territory. Information falling closer to the speaker than this (language-specific) point ($i_S \geq n$) is considered *proximal*, and thus within the speaker's territory. Other information is considered *distal*, and lies outside the speaker's territory. An identical model is proposed for the hearer, modeled by the speaker at the time of utterance. As Kamio explains (1997:17), this allows for gradient statements, such as "the information falls within both interlocutors' territories, but deeper within that of the hearer's." Graphically, this would look like the following:

[5]Kamio 2002, published posthumously, is a more accessible version of the general theory, incorporating all of Kamio's work up to and past 1997, but focusing mostly on the theory's application to related fields within linguistics. Because the basic ideas and implementation of the theory are essentially unchanged from previous publications, however, I will continue to base my analysis on Kamio 1997 and 1998.

(2.7)



As above, the i in (2.2) represents the value of the specific piece of information on each interlocutors' territorial scale. The value for n is assumed to be the same.

The theoretical framework contains two other major parts: conditions and "meta-conditions"[6] on entrance into a person's information territory. These are similar to those outlined in (2.3) above, but are greatly simplified and generalized. Furthermore, they are considered to be language-specific, both in number and quality. As an example, (2.8) and (2.9) give Kamio's (1998) characterization of conditions and meta-conditions for Japanese (pp. 30-31; translation based on Kamio (1997:39-41)).

(2.8)
a. information obtained through the speaker's/hearer's internal direct experience.
b. information obtained through the speaker's/hearer's external direct experience.
c. information embodying detailed knowledge which falls into the range of the speaker's/hearer's professional or other expertise.
d. information about persons, objects, events and facts close to the speaker/hearer, including such information about the speaker/hearer him/herself[7]

(2.9)
a. in the case where the speaker/hearer does not have an adequate basis for asserting the given piece of information, the value of i moves closer to 0.[8]
b. in the case where the given piece of information would be considered difficult to obtain for the speaker/hearer, the value of i moves closer to 0.[9]
c. until new information conveyed to the speaker/hearer has had considerable time to be processed, the value of i moves closer to 0.

[6]Many find Kamio's use of the term "meta-condition" puzzling. In later writing (Kamio 2002) the term "general conditions" (*ippan-zyooken*) is used. The reader may prefer to think of them as *positive* and *negative* conditions, respectively.

[7]It has been suggested (Trent 1997:83) that this criterion essentially refers to the social concept of *uti* 'in-group.' Kamio, however, has never used this term in the formalized versions of his theory.

[8]Earlier versions qualified this meta-condition by stating that it applied only to a certain subset of conditions, namely (2.8b-2.8d)

[9]Kamio (1995:238, VIb) states this as "information private to someone other than the speaker is considered less close to the speaker [moves closer to 0 on the scale] if the speaker is not close to that person."

The basic premise for Kamio (1997:18) is that for each condition that a given piece of information satisfied, it is considered "closer" to the speaker/hearer, and for each meta-condition satisfied, the information is considered more "distant" from the speaker/hearer. Kamio's (1998) model formalizes this terminology by proposing two "principles" of territoriality calculation (pp. 33, 35, 36), which combine basically to describe an algorithm like that in (2.10):

(2.10)
i. Set the initial value of i to 0.
ii. For each condition in (2.8) that applies to the given information, add 0.5 to the value of i.
iii. If the current value of i is greater than 1, reduce it to 1.
iv. For each meta-condition in (2.9) that applies to the given information, subtract 0.4 from the value of i.
v. If the current value of i is less than 0, increase it to 0.

Finally, Kamio (1998:36) proposes that the value of n is 0.6 in Japanese.

Before we examine closely the nature of these conditions, it will be useful to introduce the final part of the framework: the links between what Kamio calls *situation types* and utterance forms. This is represented in Table 2.1 (slightly modified from Kamio (1998:38)).

Case	Definition of Case	Utterance Form
A	$1 = i_{Speaker} > i_{Hearer} < n$	direct form
B	$1 = i_H = i_S$	direct-*ne* form
BC	$1 = i_S > i_H \geq n$	*daroo* form
CB	$n \leq i_S < i_H$	*daroo* form
C	$n > i_S < i_H = 1$	indirect-*ne* form
D	$n > i_S \geq i_H$	indirect form

Table 2.1: Cases and Utterance Forms

In Table 2.1, $i_{Speaker}$ (i_S) and i_{Hearer} (i_H) represent the value that a given piece of information i takes on the speaker's and hearer's territory scales. Kamio claims there are six cases (compare this with (2.2), which had only four cases). In the following section we will examine how this system deals with instances of Japanese utterances.[10]

[10]The above-described model is a much more involved version of Kamio's previous models. However, it has the definite advantage of making as explicit as possible what it means for a given piece of information to fall, say, "more deeply" within one person's territory than another without resorting to underspecified terms like "closer." It also makes clear the relationship between the conditions and meta-conditions, which was left vague in previous models.

2.3 A theory of territory of information for Japanese

In this section we will go over each of the cases listed in Table 2.1, examining how each of the conditions and meta-conditions given in (2.8) and (2.9) operate, and checking the validity of Kamio's connection between case and utterance types. For more detailed argumentation concerning the necessity of these particular conditions, see Kamio 1994 and 1997, and Kamio & Takami 1998.

2.3.1 Case A: Speaker's Information

First, we will examine Case A, which I will informally call *Speaker's Information.* In this case, exemplified in (2.11), the content of the information 'I [speaker] am happy' fulfills conditions (2.8a) regarding internal experience as well as (2.8d) regarding personal data, and so the information falls fully within the speaker's territory. None of the conditions in (2.8) apply to the hearer, making this a clear *Speaker's Information* case, which corresponds to the *direct form.*[11] Note that in this case, an indirect form like *yoo da* is unacceptable. Similarly, in (2.12), the information does not fulfill any of the criteria in (2.8) except possibly (2.8b) in the case that the speaker witnessed something potentially indicative of happiness. However, in this case meta-condition (2.9a) applies because witnessing only outer appearance would not be considered by the speaker to be sufficient basis for making a claim about another's mental state. Thus the single (positive) condition (2.8b) and (negative) meta-condition (2.9a) cancel out each other's effects, and the information falls outside the speaker's territory. Further, the exact same analysis can be made for the speaker, and so Case D obtains, requiring an indirect form.

(2.11) watasi wa uresii (*yoo da)
1SG TOP happy (appear)
'I am happy.'

(2.12) ano ko wa uresii *(yoo da)
that child TOP happy (appear)
'That child seems happy.'

[11]In this paper, when an asterisk (*) appears outside parentheses, as in (2.12), this is meant to indicate that *some sort* of indirect element is needed, such as *rasii* or *yoo da.* Which one is chosen depends heavily on context, but the semantics of each of these SFF is beyond the scope of the current work. In other locations, the asterisk should be taken to indicate unacceptability.

2.3.2 Case B: Shared Knowledge

Next is Case B, or *Shared Knowledge* informally. This is the case where the information falls completely into both the speaker's and the hearer's territory. A typical example of the *Shared Knowledge* case is the following: Two people from the same town are sitting outside and observing the weather, and one says to the other the utterance in (2.13):

(2.13) ii tenki da nee (=(2.4))
good weather COP *ne*
'It's a beautiful day!'

In this case, the information fulfills conditions (2.8b) and (2.8a) (the speaker both sees and has a belief about the weather), thus taking a value of $0 + 0.5 + 0.5 = 1$. The same conditions apply to the hearer, and no meta-conditions apply to either interlocutor. Thus Case B obtains and the direct-*ne* form is predicted. As noted above, the utterance takes on an entirely different feel without the *ne*—the utterance becomes more like soliloquy, and so the hearer may feel excluded, or put off by the speaker's lack of attention or recognition of his presence.

(2.14) zyon-san wa nihongo ga umai ne
TOP Japanese.language NOM skilled *ne*
'Your [John's] Japanese is good!'

A slightly different case can be observed in (2.14). The context is such that the speaker observes John speaking Japanese. The speaker recognizes this as Japanese, though she is not an expert on the language, and later directly addresses John, uttering the above sentence. Here the fact that the John is skilled in Japanese falls within the speaker's territory by two conditions: external experience (hearing him speak) and internal experience (holding the belief that John is skilled), giving a final value of 1. On the other hand, two different conditions apply to John: expert knowledge and personal data. Condition (2.8b) may also apply, if we consider the fact that John must have heard himself speaking Japanese. In either case, Case B still holds and the theory correctly accounts for the direct form and obligatory *ne*.

2.3.3 Case BC: Speaker's Prominence

Speaker's Prominence can be described as the case when the speaker feels the information is hers to the deepest degree, and the hearer to a slightly lesser degree. For instance, if the

speaker works in Yosemite, and the hearer has just arrived there for the first time and smells the air, then the speaker can says to her city-dwelling friend:

(2.15) kuuki ga kiree desyoo
air NOM clean *daroo*
'Isn't the air so clean?'

For the speaker, all four conditions apply (she smells the air, holds beliefs regarding the air, has expert knowledge about the air quality in Yosemite, and is close geographically and psychologically to the park), so the final value of i_S is 1. The speaker then computes how she believes the information falls within the territory of the hearer. Conditions (2.8b) and (2.8a) apply, but in the case of (2.8a), the speaker does not have enough evidence to be sure that the hearer actually thinks that the air is clean (that is, after all, why the someone would utter a sentence like (2.15) in the first place). Thus, meta-condition (2.9a) applies, and the final value of i_H is $0 + 0.5 + 0.5 - 0.4 = 0.6$. This is equal to n, and so clearly Case BC applies. Kamio's model correctly predicts the *daroo* form.

2.3.4 Case CB: Hearer's Prominence

In the case of *Hearer's Prominence*, the information falls within both interlocutors' territories, but deeper within the hearer's. An example would be where two people, Ralph and Judy are sitting together and Judy sees someone she believes is Ralph's friend. For Judy, conditions (2.8b) about external experience and (2.8a) about internal experience apply, but for the latter Judy does not have a strong basis for her belief that the person she sees is actually Ralph's friend. Thus meta-condition (2.9a) applies, yielding a final value of 0.6 for Judy. On the other hand, all the conditions except for (2.8c) on expert knowledge apply to Ralph, and no meta-conditions apply, yielding a final value of 1. Case CB obtains, and *daroo* form is expected. This is indeed the case:

(2.16) ano hito, kimi no tomodati daro
that person you GEN friend *daroo*
'That guy is your friend, right?'

2.3.5 Case C: Hearer's Knowledge

Cases of *Hearer's Knowledge* primarily deal with those instances where the speaker feels that something regarding the hearer might be the case, but is mostly unsure. Most psychological utterances in Japanese fall into this category. For instance:

(2.17) anata wa sabisii yoo da ne
2SG TOP lonely *yoo da ne*
'You seem lonely.'

In this case, the information does not fall within the speaker's territory due to meta-conditions (2.9a) and (2.9b), but has a value of 1 for the hearer, for whom conditions (2.8a) and (2.8d) apply. Kamio's predicted indirect-*ne* form is indeed the appropriate form.

2.3.6 Case D: No one's Knowledge

Finally, there is Case D, where the uttered information does not fall within either interlocutor's territory. These are primarily cases where the speaker has recently received news from some distant source regarding something not deeply related to herself. For instance:

(2.18) california de oozisin ga atta soo da (yo)
at large earthquake NOM occurred *soo da* (*yo*)
'I heard there was a big earthquake in California.'

If neither of the interlocutors are connected to California, and are not seismologists or geologists from the area around California, and if the speaker recently acquired this information, then only one condition (the one regarding direct external experience) applies, whereas the meta-condition regarding recently-acquired information (2.9c) applies, giving a final value of 0.1. The value of i_H at the time of the utterance is 0, so this is Case D, with indirect form.

What is absolutely essential to understand about Kamio's conception of territory is that given a particular "case," there is very little wiggle room regarding the possible forms that can be used (at least in Japanese). For any of the above cases, if the speaker were to use some other form, such as using a *ne* where Case A obtains, or failing to use *daroo* where Case BC obtains, the result would be an infelicitous utterance. This is a significant result of Kamio's work. Forms like *ne* that were taken to be purely optional are revealed as *obligatory* in some situations. In fact, Kamio (1998:47-53) has a lengthy discussion of the properties of *ne* in terms of the theory of territory of information. Although the work is incomplete, it has certainly revived the discussion of pragmatic elements in Japanese discourse.

2.4 Beyond the basic cases

The above comprises the core part of Kamio's theory of territory of information and an example of one application of the theory to a specific language. Kamio has also, with some degree of success, extended the very same framework to explain other aspects of Japanese. In particular, the sentence-final particle *ne* (see in particular Kamio 1997:51-54 and Kamio 1998:47-53) and the nature of psychological utterances (i.e., those involving "psych-predicates" like *happy*, *think*, and *hate*) in Japanese and English (Kamio 1995). More recently Kamio has suggested a model for English and Japanese demonstratives in their discourse usages (Kamio 2001), and in various places has argued for drawing strong connections between his theory that those of evidentiality and politeness, even to the point of partial unification of these two fields (Kamio 1997:185-187).

Chapter 3

Revising the territory of information

Kamio's (1997, 1998) framework for describing the distribution of certain Japanese sentence-final forms (SFF) claims to take into account one dimension of data—the territoriality of the information. The nature of this territoriality is described by Kamio as a set of criteria that a speaker would use in order to determine what sort of linguistic form is appropriate for a given situation.

However, several types objections to this view of SFFs have been raised by various researchers. A common type seen among linguists in the tradition of discourse analysis (Cook (1990), Maynard (1993), Rudolph (1993)) is that Kamio's framework, while it may reveal certain information-based aspects of SFFs, cannot possibly explain the total range of uses, requiring a larger social or pragmatic framework to flesh out the essential properties of *ne*, etc. Another view, often (though not always) taken by researchers in Japan, is that Kamio's theory is on the right track but needs to be reformulated, adjusted, or augmented in some manner to be more internally consistent and descriptively adequate (Kitano (1993), Okamoto (1996)). In this paper I will be mostly discussing these two types of criticisms and the models that have emerged with them. There is, though, a third type of criticism: namely, that of Takubo & Kinsui (2000), who state that the use of *ne* and *yo* is mostly cognitive in nature, and *entirely* speaker-oriented (i.e., no mention of "hearer's knowledge," even within a mental model of the speaker). According to Takubo & Kinsui, any and all discourse pragmatic "functions" are purely epiphenomenal. Although the points they raise are important and require consideration, due to length considerations I will refrain from discussing their work in this thesis.

In this section, I will first consider the "modification"-type criticisms and summarize the types of findings in those studies. The overall validity of territory-type analyses of Japanese

SFFs will then be discussed.

3.1 Information and knowledge

One of the earliest modifications based on Kamio's (1990) framework is Kitano 1993. In this study Kitano attempts to give a single characterization for the sentence-final particle *ne*. Although he eventually goes on to propose a characterization independent of the notion of territory, he first suggests a revision to Kamio's (1990) framework outlined above in (2.2) and (2.3) that includes reference to "known" and "unknown" information. In other words, he says there are cases where a given piece of information may be outside both the speaker's and hearer's territory (2.2d) and the hearer is aware of that information, and other cases where the hearer is not aware of that information. In the latter case, *ne* is obligatory but not so in the former case. Kitano, however, does not give any specific instances where such a distinction would have to be made, and does not make explicit what he intends by the categories "known" and "unknown." Indeed, there are some cases where the distinction would not have to be made:

(3.1)

atama	ga	itai
head	NOM	hurts

'My head hurts / I have a headache.'

Regardless the state of the hearer's knowledge regarding this information, the direct form without *ne* is the appropriate form for this utterance. Akatsuka (1985) and Kamio (1997) point out that for Japanese speakers, certain types of information, particularly that regarding other people's personal data and mental states are in certain respects "unknowable." If this is the case, then there will be a large class of information for which Kitano's revision of Kamio's theory is superfluous. The only case, in fact, where Kitano's known/unknown distinction becomes important is in Kamio's (1998) Case D, No One's Information. Take the following pair of utterances:

(3.2) a.

raisyuu	atarasii	kyookoo	ga	kuru	rasii	(yo)
next.week	new	pope	NOM	come	*rasii*	(*yo*)

'It looks like the new pope will be coming next week.'

b.

raisyuu	atarasii	kyookoo	ga	kuru	rasii	ne
next.week	new	pope	NOM	come	*rasii*	*ne*

'It looks like the new pope will be coming next week, huh?'

In (3.2a), the speaker is assuming that the hearer has not heard anything about the news, whereas in (3.2b), the speaker is not assuming that the hearer has not heard anything about it. A natural situation for the second utterance is where both speakers have just seen the same television broadcast.

The only situation in which Kamio's theory calls for the indirect-*ne* form (as in 3.2b) is in the case of Hearer's Prominence, or Case CB, which this certainly is not. Kamio (1998:49-50) does have an explanation for what he calls "optional *ne*," of which there are several types. However, his explanation cannot be directly applied to this particular case, and so indeed this is a valid criticism of Kamio's theory.[1]

3.2 Information and degree of involvement

Okamoto (1996) argues that a major reworking of Kamio's (1990) framework is necessary, based on the following three deficiencies he sees in the territory theory (Okamoto 1996:173):

(3.3) a. Kamio assumes a binary distinction between "in" and "out" of territory. Instead, there should be degrees of relationship to a piece of information.

b. Kamio does not clearly distinguish the concept of territory from the concept of "certainty of information" (*zyoohoo-syozi no kakuzitu-see*). For instance, although Kamio (1990:17–18, 48–49) argues that territoriality is distinct from possession or certainty of information, he includes criteria like "experienced directly" and "from a reliable source."

c. In Kamio's framework, the speaker's territory has influence only on the directness or indirectness of the utterance, and the hearer's territory has influence only on the presence or absence of *ne*, and this cannot be explained.

As regards the first point, Every work of Kamio's on territory since 1994 has incorporated the idea of degrees of territoriality. However, the other two points remain valid. First, Kamio's theory still mixes purely evidential criteria that deal with sources of information along with criteria like expertise (2.8c) and personal data (2.8d). Second, it remains true in Kamio 1998 that the directness of an utterance can be attributed to properties of the

[1] Kamio's (1998) account of "optional *ne*" is geared toward cases like *500-en desu ne* 'That will be 500 yen' where the speaker is utilizing the so-called *outbound strategy* of politeness by acting as though some information falls outside their own territory when in fact she may have legitimate claim to it (Kamio 1997:189). However, it seems clear that in the case raised by Kitano cannot be explained by Kamio's model.

speaker's territory and the presence or absence of *ne* to properties of the hearer's territory (i.e., direct corresponds to $i_S = 1$; indirect to $i_S < n$; and *ne* to $H = 1$).

Regarding this last point, although the lack of an explanation for the distribution of influence of the two territories is troubling and requires consideration, this question is independent of the accuracy of the model in predicting the distribution of SFFs. I will therefore restrict discussion of Okamoto's criticisms to his second point. Okamoto's criticism is quite valid, and he presents several dialogues that do not seem to be explainable within Kamio's version of territory theory. I reproduce two below. In the first (3.4) the situation is a picnic:

(3.4) Speaker B has taken out a bottle of wine from his bag in plain sight of speaker A.

A. oya, wain o motte kita n da ne
hey, wine ACC brought NOM COP *ne*.
'Hey, you brought some wine!'

B. un, motte kita {*ne / yo}
yeah, brought
'Yeah, I did.'

In this situation (cf Okamoto (1996:171)), the information *B brought wine* is within A's territory due to criteria (2.8a) and (2.8b), and within B's due to the same two as well as that regarding close personal data, since she was the one to pack, bring, and take out the wine. Thus Case B should obtain, requiring direct-*ne* form. However, *ne* is unacceptable in this case. In the second example (similar to (3.2), cf Okamoto 1996:172), the situation is that one person is watching the news, and reports what he heard to another person, who did not hear the broadcast.

(3.5) miyazaki de wa moo sakura ga saita rasii (yo)
at TOP already cherry-blossom NOM bloomed *rasii* (*yo*)
It looks like the cherry blossoms have already bloomed in Miyazaki.

This matches the criteria for Kamio's Case D (No One's Knowledge), and so the indirect form is predicted, correctly. However, in the case that the addressee of the above utterance was watching the news at the same time, and the speaker is aware of this fact, then *ne* is obligatory. For Kamio, the same situation holds, since neither the speaker nor the hearer have any information but hearsay, which can never by itself licence territoriality. Thus he cannot predict this obligatory use of *ne*. Observing these problems with Kamio's theory, Okamoto proposed a new model that would avoid the problems noted above and also cover a wider range of data. In the following section I will present a modified version of his model.

3.2.1 A model of involvement

Okamoto claims that the theoretical weakness in Kamio's (1990) framework noted above in (3.3b) is the reason for the unexplainability of these examples. He proposes a model that incorporates a concept of territoriality independent of evidentiality. He calls this concept *kan'yo-do* or *degree of involvement* (or *relatedness*). He gives several criteria for determining "certainty" and "involvement" (pp. 177,178), but his characterizations are very informal, and Okamoto himself did not attempt to quantify his criteria as Kamio (1998) did. Though there were further inadequacies in his description, such as a failure to give an "intuitive" definition of involvement aside from the various criteria used for calculating it. However, because my purpose in this section is to present Okamoto's work in a manner that is comparable to Kamio's work, I will not directly address these inadequacies here. I will instead, present a modified version of Okamoto's model comparable to the territory model presented above (i.e., that of Kamio 1997, 1998), which accounts equally well for the data presented in Okamoto 1996.

Okamoto (1996) never uses the term "territory," but his characterization of degree of involvement, set out below, is rather transparently related to the idea of territory. However, in avoiding the metaphor of territories, Okamoto dodges the non-intuitive cases where information can somehow "fall into" both the speaker's and hearer's territories. However, in terms of substance, I do not believe that there are significant differences here. All one needs to do in order to incorporate territoriality is to state that speakers "claim" ownership of information in which they are more involved.

In Tables 3.1 and 3.2 (p. 26), I present the first part of a quantified version of the model. The two tables lay out the factors involved in determining certainty and degree of involvement. The factors themselves, such as "difficulty in perception" are taken directly from Okamoto. However, the precise values of each factor, and the method for calculating the degrees of involvement and certainty are my interpretations based on Okamoto's work.[2]

The three subgroups in Table 3.1 divide the factors into those that involve direct perception of an event (the first two factors), those that involve other methods of acquiring information (the next two), and manners of acquisition. The "values" in the table are used for calculating levels of certainty and involvement according to the following scheme:

(3.6) i. Set the initial value for certainty/involvement to 0.

[2]Okamoto's paper included several hard-to-decipher graphs without values or precise boundaries, and so these are at best approximations of vague intuitions. Given that, however, they seem to perform comparably to Kamio's model, at least in some areas.

Positive factors	value	value	Negative factors
Direct experience	+1	$total \times 0.5$	Difficulty in perception
Functioning sensory organs	+1		
Hearsay	+0.5	$\times 0.5$	Unreliable source of information
Inference	+0.5	$\times 0.5$	Insufficient grounds for inference
Sufficient use of acquisition method	+1		
Recency of contact with information	+1	$\times 0.5$	Long time away from information
Repetition of contact with information	+1		

Table 3.1: Factors for certainty

Positive factors	value	value	Negative factors
Condition of one's body	+1		
Possessions	+1	$total \times 0.5$	Information regarding those close to one's self
Plans / History	+1		
Birthplace / Place of residence	+1		
Field of expertise	+1		
Duty / Role	+1	$total \times 0.25$	Information regarding others
Length and depth of relationship +1			
Importance	+1		

Table 3.2: Factors for involvement

ii. For each positive factor that applies, add the given value *unless* it has a corresponding negative factor (i.e., those with values of the form $\langle \times n \rangle$). In that case, first multiply the positive value by the negative value, and then add the product to the running total.

iii. If any "global" negative factors apply (i.e., those with values of the form $\langle total \times n \rangle$), then after adding all other positive factors, multiply the total by the given value(s).

This algorithm is applied to both the speaker and hearer for any given utterance, and four values are computed: both the certainty and degree of involvement for the speaker and hearer. The appropriate linguistic form is then determined according to the following rules:

- If the speaker's (degree of) involvement is less than the hearer's (degree of) involvement:
  - If the speaker's certainty is equal to or less than the hearer's, then *ne* is preferred. If it is greater than the hearer's, *ne* is not used.
  - If the certainty of the speaker is 3.5 or more, then the direct form is used. If it is less than 3.5 then the indirect form is preferred.
- If the speaker's involvement equals the hearer's involvement:
  - If the speaker's certainty is equal to or less than the hearer's, then *ne* is preferred. If it is greater than the hearer's, *ne* is not used.
  - If the certainty of the speaker is 2.5 or more, then the direct form is used. If it is less than 2.5 then the indirect form is used.
- If the speaker's involvement is greater than the hearer's involvement:
  - If the speaker's certainty is less than the hearer's then *ne* is preferred. If it is equal to or greater than the hearer's, then *ne* is not used.
  - If the speaker's certainty is 2.25 or more, then the direct form is used. If it is less than 2.25, then the indirect form is preferred.

These rules, though rather cryptic, do actually reflect Okamoto's original conception.[3] In each of the three cases, there are two types of significance that certainty can have—absolute

[3]Okamoto's original characterization is as follows (1996, 177–8, translated into English by the current author):

and relative. In the absolute cases, the trend is always that lower values mean indirect sentence endings. In the relative cases, it is always the case that lower values mean using *ne*. Furthermore, the effect of involvement acts in the expected way. As the speaker's degree of involvement increases relative to the hearer's the direct/indirect threshold decreases, meaning direct forms are more likely. The same is true for involvement's effect on the presence or absence of *ne*.

3.2.2 Application of the model

An example should be helpful in understanding how this system works. Take the situation given above in (3.5). In this case, assume that no positive factors of involvement apply to either interlocutor, i.e., the involvement levels are equal. The positive certainty factors that apply to the speaker are (i) hearsay, (ii) functioning sensory organs, and (iii) recency of contact; there are no negative factors, assuming the speaker trusts the news agency. This yields a value of $0.5 + 1 + 1 = 2.5$. If (the speaker believes that) the hearer has not seen the news, then her certainty value is 0. The model predicts that *ne* is not used and that the direct form is used—this is correct. On the other hand, if the hearer saw the news broadcast along with the speaker, then their certainty value would also be 2.5, and so *ne* would be predicted along with the direct form—again, this matches native speaker intuition. Similar correct predictions hold for all other sentence types, at least of the kind investigated by Okamoto and Kamio.

However, as I will argue in following sections, there are some basic assumptions that are implicit in territory-based models that undermine their descriptive and explanatory power. Essentially, these theories claim that the characterization of SFPs should be primarily cognitive, and that SFPs reflect, rather than change, the social or cognitive relationship between interlocutors. As such, they do not index affective stance *per se*, but rather can acquire these "meanings" through some set of general pragmatic principles.

(I) a. The higher the speaker's certainty of the information, the more natural the direct form will be; the lower the certainty, the more natural the indirect form will be.

b. If the speaker's certainty is higher than that of the hearer, then a sentence without *ne* will be more natural; if the certainty of the speaker is equal to or less then that of the hearer, then a sentence with *ne* will be more natural.

(II) a. If the speaker's degree of involvement (regarding the uttered information) is lower than that of the hearer, then the use of indirect form and *ne* becomes more natural.

b. If the speaker's degree of involvement is higher than that of the hearer, then the use of direct form without *ne* becomes more natural.

3.3 What's wrong with territories?

As noted above, I will claim that the territory models, despite their accuracy in describing some linguistic phenomena, have some serious pitfalls, not least among them the heavy emphasis placed on the *conditions* under which certain linguistic forms are *acceptable*, as opposed to the *goals* of speakers and how these forms can be used to *achieve* those goals. In this section, I will examine the consequences of territory theorists' answers to the questions raised in (1.2).

It should immediately be clear that the involvement-based mini-grammar of Japanese utterance types is conceptually very similar to Kamio's territory-based mini-grammar. First, if this model is to be considered explanatory, then there must first be the assumption that language *reflects* the reality of the situation. That is, the speaker calculates the "certainty" and "degree of involvement" that each interlocutor holds at time of utterance, and then selects the sentence type that *corresponds* to that particular arrangement. Furthermore, this means that the nature of what Kamio (1997:53) calls "optional *ne*" is the exception to the rule and must be explained away by separate pragmatic or discourse-functional principles. In this case, any similarities that may be perceived between required and optional *ne*, or indeed any seemingly-optional uses of modals in general, must be accidental.

This is especially clear when we compare Kamio's (1997) characterization of optional *ne* with the one later proposed in 1998. In the former, optional *ne* can be used when the information uttered is closer to the speaker's territory than it is to the hearer's (i.e., $i_S \geq i_H$). In the latter work, there are in fact *three* subcategories of optional *ne*, but none of them exactly match the 1997 characterization. The closest is $i_S \geq i_H < n$, though Kamio also gives $i_S < n < i_H$ as an acceptable configuration. Although this may be accurate in the sense that there is a definite correlation between the cases where "optional" *ne* is used and these territory configurations, it makes very little intuitive sense, and does not go anywhere towards claiming a systematicity among the various uses of *ne*. I can think of no principled explanation for why a particle used when $i_H = 1$ obtains (obligatory *ne*) should have an optional use when 'the speaker claims more territoriality than the hearer, who does not claim territoriality.' In other words, these characterizations just do not dovetail with common intuitions about these SFPs, namely that they deal with speaker interrelationships and building cooperative rapport.

Indeed, even regarding obligatory *ne*, Kamio (1997) notes that, although the characterization $i_H = 1$ is "well in accord with our intuitive understanding of [its] function" (p. 52), it is not enough: "a comprehensive characterization of *ne* is a task for the theory of sentence-

final forms in general" (p. 200). What I take this to mean is that territoriality necessarily accounts for some uses of *ne*, and not for others. However, the situation is even worse, for one main reason. Observe first that the "meaning" of the variety of *ne* (or any SFP) accounted for in territory theory can only be something like 'the sentence I am attached to has such-and-such a territory relationship to its speaker and addressee.' Two alternatives are then possible: either the full theory of SFFs will contain multiple lexical entries for *ne*, some of which will have territory-related meanings, or the grammar will contain a long list of different (and often unrelated) territory configurations under which *ne* is optionally used. When combined with the semi-systematic uses of SFFs to achieve politeness effects (cf Kamio 1997:187–194) the senses of *ne* and other SFFs proliferates quickly, and any underlying systematicity is pushed under the rug. Any similarity that may be noticed cannot be expressed within the model, and must be considered accidental.

It is thus no coincidence that Okamoto's model resembles Kamio's in many ways. Despite differences in terminology (e.g., "involvement" versus "territory") and descriptive coverage, both frameworks implicitly claim the existence of at least two types of SFF in Japanese. The first is the kind explained above, which has negligible communicative function *per se*, and merely reflects the epistemological beliefs of the speaker. The second is the kind that can be used optionally, to communicate various "meanings" like politeness, deference, requests for confirmation, and so on. Such uses do not have a place in the purely "cognitive" models described above. On the other hand, such uses take center stage in socio-pragmatic models of SFFs, where they do not so much reflect an objective reality as create a conversational environment by indexing affect and attitudinal stances of speakers. In these models, previously "exceptional" cases become the norm. As a typical example of such approaches, I will present the work of Rudolph (1993).

Chapter 4

Territory and social role

There have been several attempts to argue against Kamio's (1990) conception of evidentiality as a purely cognitive phenomenon, noting that what counts as "direct experience" or knowledge of "facts" can be highly culturally dependant. In particular, Rudolph (1993) argues that given the range of social variables, a socially-based framework for describing Japanese SFPs would be more valuable than one that ignores these in favor of a purely cognitive-evidential based conception of modality (p. 59). To demonstrate her point, Rudolph presents the following near-minimal pair (p. 55–58):

(4.1) a. doomo saikin i ga warui mitai desu
apparently recently stomach NOM bad *mitai* COP
'Recently my child apparently seems to have stomach trouble.'

b. # doomo onaka ga ippai mitai desu
apparently stomach NOM full *mitai* COP
'My stomach apparently seems to be full.

In the first case (4.1a), the speaker is the mother of a child, telling her doctor about pain or discomfort that her child has been complaining about. Here it is possible to explain the use of the indirect form with Kamio's framework, noting that the speaker's basis for claiming *i ga warui* is based on inference and some external experience with the child, not on internal experience. However, according to Rudolpheven *after* the doctor has confirmed that in fact it is a problem with the stomach, the mother must still use the indirect form despite the fact that the mother's cognitive state has been altered by virtue of speaking with the doctor (ibid., p. 57). Although Kamio's framework can explain this by appealing to the expert knowledge criterion (2.8c), it misses the fact that "the 'socially-valued' nature of

the linguistic act of 'making a diagnosis' is an important variable in explaining the usage [in (4.1a)]" (p. 58).

This contrast is important when considering the two sentences above as a minimal pair, where both speakers are also the experiencers (of pain in (4.1a) and being full in (4.1b)). The former remains appropriate (in any situation where the speaker is reporting the pain to the addressee—regardless of who the addressee is), but the latter is inappropriate in all normal situations, despite the fact that in both, the speaker has equal access to the information. The only difference is that "the condition judged to be extant in [(4.1b)] is not one which . . . is subject to 'diagnosis' (Rudolph 1993:59). This pushes her to propose a model based on a concept of social role to account for the uses of Japanese SFPs.

4.1 Social role

Rudolph defines "social role" as:

> [T]he domain of expertise from which a participant speaks, where expertise is the body of knowledge a speaker is licensed to control as a conversational resource in a given interaction by virtue of socially-validated and/or socially-valued training, interpersonal or intrapersonal experiences (including non-voluntary states of being such as birthright) and physical or mental traits **which are relevant to the given interactive context**. (1993:64, emphasis original)

Given this definition, the possibilities for "social role" are quite wide. They could be as simple as socially-recognized positions like "professor" or "diplomat," or as context-bound as "person who saw the accident first-hand." Even these, however, must be further qualified by the context in which an utterance is made. For instance, the role of "linguistics professor" is relevant in the classroom, but not in, for instance, a CPR certification class (Rudolph 1993:68). Thus what is important is not so much the social position or rank, but the *information* that one can claim access to in a given situation by virtue of being in some given social position.

The other key concept in Rudolph's model is the idea of "new*" information (so marked to distinguish it from simply "new" information), as opposed to information "in evidence." The latter is defined as information that is available to the speaker by means of "direct experience/observation or . . . presupposed commonsensical or scripted knowledge" (Rudolph 1993:147). Here Rudolph truly does mean *common* sense, i.e., knowledge that one assumes

is available to everyone in the speech situation, not specially marked as knowledge available only to experts. On the other hand, new* information is that which is unique to a particular social role, and which is positively marked as "accessible to experts only." Of course, the classification of any particular piece of information as new* relies on both the speaker and the hearer—after all, if the hearer does not affirm the speaker's social role, then there can be no classification of any information as for "experts only." These two classes of information form the basis for Rudolph's analysis of Japanese SFPs.

The analysis given places three SFPs, *ne*, *no*, and *yo* in a paradigmatic relationship regarding in-evidence and new* information.[1] The definitions are given in (4.2) below:

(4.2)
a. If a proposition is comprised of information that is new* either solely to the hearer or jointly to the speaker and hearer, then *ne* will be used to mark the utterance containing that proposition (143–4).[2]
b. If a proposition is comprised of information that is "in evidence" then *no* will be used to mark the utterance containing that proposition (144).
c. If a proposition is comprised of information licensed uniquely by the speaker (i.e., new* only to the speaker) then *yo* will be used to mark the utterance containing that proposition (276).

Crucial to Rudolph's analysis is that although these constitute the "literal," or basic, uses of these SFPs, the speaker can use these strategically ("rhetorically," in her terminology) to achieve a particular conversational purpose. Which particle is used depends not on social role, but on knowledge, i.e., who holds knowledge of the information in the utterance. For example, a speaker who uses *yo* when uttering information that is known to both the speaker and hearer, contrary to the speaker-only condition outlined above, may be indicating negative affect by depriving the addressee of ownership of the information and claiming it for one's self instead. The speaker is essentially using an SFP that denies mutual knowledege, even while perfectly aware that both she and her addressee are (mutually) aware of a certain

[1]Rudolph carries out a detailed analysis of *no* as a sentence-final particle, but because the other works considered in this paper did not consider *no* as a part of the evidential/territorial paradigm, I will not go into great detail regarding that aspect of her analysis.

[2]Unfortunately, throughout her work, Rudolph gives sometimes inconsistent accounts of what *ne* is a index of. On page 144, she claims *ne* marks information that is new*, but that is "not yet licensed by the hearer's social role." Later, on page 169 she states that "the primary condition required for *ne* is that the speaker acknowledges that the hearer is licensed (uniquely or concurrently with the speaker) to access the information . . . as an informational resource." Further inconsistencies are sprinkled throughout the text (see, e.g., the explanation for Rudolph's (18d) on page 164). I have taken the most general characterization possible given all the utterances with *ne* that she examines.

piece of information. All of the particles she discusses have similar rhetorical uses (Rudolph 1993:165,181,267). In the following section, I will examine some of the sentences brought up earlier to see if they can be explained by the social role model.

4.2 Application of the model

First, examine the obligatory *ne* in (2.5). In this case, if speaker B acknowledges A's social role as musician and creator of the song in question, then B must also recognize A's license to make judgements about the song. Speaker B may also judge herself as being in a sort of "musical critic" social role (having just been asked to judge the song), and so the information *it's a good song* is new* information to both speaker and hearer, and thus *ne* is used. Similarly, the speaker in (2.14), as either a native speaker of Japanese or person who has studied the language, occupies a social role that licenses her to judge the skill of a non-native speaker. Thus the information *your Japanese is good* is new* information, marked obligatorily with *ne*. Other examples of direct-*ne* utterances seem to fall in line with the social role analysis.

On the other hand, the utterance in (2.17) is a little different. First, it certainly requires the indirect form, and it is not clear under Rudolph's description of her model whether or not evidential forms count as "information." Assuming for now that they do not, then the information uttered (*you are lonely*) is new* to the hearer, but not to the speaker. The speaker, however, must have some external evidence or previous experience with the hearer that makes her think that the hearer is lonely. This is similar to another of Rudolph's examples, duplicated below.

(4.3) Two students have just been let out of lecture at noon, and one student addresses the other, uttering either a. or b.:

a. taberu ne?
eat *ne*
'You're going to eat, right?'

b. taberu no?
eat *no*
'Are you going to eat?'

In (4.3a), the situation must be that the hearer always eats lunch after class as a matter of daily routine. That is, the information is not "in evidence," and there is no commonsensical or observation-based inference that the speaker is making to guess at the hearer's current plans. Instead, the information that the hearer is going to eat is specifically licensed by the hearer's social role: the speaker has *some* knowledge of this information by virtue of regular interaction with the hearer. This knowledge is accessible to the speaker, but only "through confirmation checks or direct requests for information" (164). On the other hand, in (4.3b), the speaker marks the utterance as containing in-evidence information, meaning that she is using some commonsense reasoning, e.g., noting that the hearer is walking towards the cafeteria, that she is checking how much money she has, and so on. The question is: which of these descriptions seems most applicable to the case in (2.17)?

It seems to me that both apply to some degree. The speaker of (2.17) may have some external evidence upon which to base her conclusion, such as how the addressee is behaving, what their posture is, etc., and may also have some background knowledge of the addressee's life circumstances that may increase the likelihood of feeling lonely. The speaker may even have some knowledge of the addressee in general, and how he usually reacts to various changes in his life. This would seem to be a combination of the two circumstances described above. However, it is clear that *no* is absolutely ungrammatical in this case (as a statement; as a question, *sabisii no?* is acceptable), and that although *ne* is required, the evidential modal is also equally required. Rudolph's model cannot account for this.

Another commonly-cited example of *ne* is the type seen in (2.13). The proper response to this utterance must include *ne*, e.g., *soo da ne* 'It is, isn't it.' However, it is hard to imagine that the speaker here is actually claiming the goodness of the weather "as an informational resource that is available to him/her" (Rudolph 1993:157), when the *expected* response is for the hearer to claim the exact same thing. In fact, in the case where one speaker "assumes [the other] will share his/her commonsense assumptions about" the given information, *no*

is the appropriate particle (Rudolph 1993:159). However, *no* is absolutely out for cases like (2.13). This would seem to be a major shortcoming in Rudolph's model.

As we have seen, although Rudolph presents a framework within which she can analyze all of the uses of *ne* in her corpus, there are some paradigm examples in the literature that do not seem to lend themselves to the social-role based analysis. This may be due to the fact that Rudolph's corpus was a set of interactions between a professor and several graduate students in seminar and office hour settings, where the hierarchical nature of the interaction was highlighted. The role of the professor is to give information out to the students, and to encourage them to act as more fully-fledged members of their speech community; on the other hand, the role of the student is to accept this information and at the same time behave as "professional linguistics." These are two types of goals, information-oriented and interaction-oriented, and so an asymmetry is expected in types of SFP uses. Indeed, in the seminar situation, 32 of the professor's 42 instances of SFPs were rhetorical/affective, often "giving" of new* information (Rudolph 1993:280, see also pp. 241–4 for a discussion of "giving" information). On the other hand, in the office hour situation, all 39 of the student's SFP uses were non-rhetorical (303). Her analysis, then, may have been significantly biased from the start due to the unbalanced nature of her corpus.

In fact, Rudolph notes early on that this may be a potential problem in her methodology:

> In contexts where the social or institutional context of the interaction is one in which non-informational social goods are not the primary focus of the interaction, the relevance of "social status" is greatly diminished and the sense that social roles need even be normatively ranked becomes questionable. (1993:73–4)

Clearly, further research is necessary to determine exactly how well the social role model of SFPs fits data taken from conversations between speakers with non-hierarchically ranked social positions.

Additionally, however, there are reasons that one might wish to reconsider a purely social-role based analysis. First, Rudolph's model takes into account only three Japanese SFPs, leaving out several other SFPs like *wa* (similar to *yo*, though often characterized as "women's speech" in the standard dialect). Second, and more significantly, there is no mention of SFFs like *daroo* and *rasii* that Kamio (1998) and Okamoto (1996) claim stand in a paradigmatic relationship with SFPs. It seems that a proper model of Japanese modality should take into account these observations.

Chapter 5

Towards a unified approach

At this point, I would like to summarize the basic findings regarding Japanese sentence-final forms and their relationship to information and "territory," broadly defined:

(5.1) a. The concept of *evidentiality* which primarily indexes sources of knowledge, must be separated from the concept of *territory* or *involvement*, which primarily indexes a speaker's *inherent* stance towards or relationship with a particular piece of information (Chapter 3; see also Anderson 1986 for a discussion of types of evidentiality).

b. Although evidentiality is not context-dependent, territoriality is. For instance, whether one received information via hearsay or not is true regardless the content of the information, but whether one can claim to be an expert on a given topic will depend greatly on the immediate speech situation (Chapters 2 and 4).

c. Both evidentiality-indexing and territory-indexing SFFs can be used *strategically*, i.e., with affective/rhetorical effect in order to further communicative or interactive goals (Chapter 4, and the current chapter).

d. There must be a concept of something like "common ground," be it common knowledge (Kamio 1997, Okamoto 1996), commonly-recognized social norms (Rudolph 1993), or affective common ground (Cook 1990).

To these I add the following claims that I will pursue in this chapter:

(5.1) e. Though the notion of "territory" is useful, the particular metaphor evoked by the term does not intuitively correspond to the facts of Japanese evidentiality and modality in general, and in fact obscures key facts that otherwise would

lead to a simpler analysis of SFFs. The idea of "territory" is decomposed into its components, in particular the idea of "expected knowledge," i.e., that information that speakers assume is known or accessible to others. Other general pragmatic and interactional properties of discourse like the Gricean maxims also play a vital role.

f. What is considered "expected knowledge" varies widely depending on several factors, including addressee identity, immediate discourse context, and conversational goals. Speakers can, in making utterances with SFPs, assert or change what they feel should be considered expected information.

g. As claimed implicitly by Kamio (1998), *daroo* and its related forms are separate from other SFFs in that *daroo* deals with inference and reasoning to the exclusion of other types of evidentiality (such as hearsay).

In the following sections I will go into detail regarding these claims.

5.1 Territory and sentence-final particles

Particles such as *yo* and *ne* have very nebulous meanings. In particular, as should be clear from the above discussion of SFPs, *ne* has an extremely wide range of uses. Faced with this complexity, various frameworks have attempted to account for only a subset of these senses, or claimed the existence of multiple lexical entries for *ne*. Although I make no claims as to the possibility of a single "meaning" for *all* uses of *ne*, I will in this section present a unified account of the uses of *ne* raised above, as well as some additional uses.

My analysis starts from the idea that speakers will do their best to satisfy the communicative/interactive desires of their interlocutors, within the bounds of their ability. In other words, speakers will be cooperative (in the Gricean sense) when asked. Further, speakers view the giving and receiving of information as positive as long as it contributes to a maintenance of a common "informational" ground from which to further the conversation. Additionally, speakers will maintain an awareness of what sort of information they expect their interlocutors to have accessible to them, and also what sort of information their interlocutors might expect them to have available themselves (I call this body of information "expected knowledege"). Speakers take as a basic assumption that people in fact are aware of, or have access to information that they are expected to know ("actual knowledge"). This assumption could be broken when, for instance, the speaker realizes that the hearer is un-

aware of something that she (the speaker) expected him to be aware of, or when the speaker is aware of some fact that she assumes an interlocuter does not expect her to know.

I will claim that these notions of expected and actual knowledge are in fact the basic elements behind the idea of territory. Cases where the speaker asserts that some piece of information is in her territory, or recognizes that some information falls within another's territory, can be reanalyzed as the speaker making assumptions about what sort of information she and her addressee are *expected* to know and what they actually *do* know. Of course, these expectations can often be captured by appealing to a concept like territory, and then the linguistic analysis becomes simpler, in a sense. However, this is not always the case, and the metaphor of territory is simply inappropriate in many cases. Further, it is just as possible to formulate a theory of territory of information in a framework of experientially-based frames and idealized cognitive models (Fillmore 1982, 1985; Lakoff 1987), and so the question of the value of territory as a concept in and of itself becomes questionable. Nevertheless, in some instances making reference to "territory" is useful, and so I will continue to do so, noting when I do how it can be decomposed into more basic elements.[1]

The vast and complex assumptions that speakers make about their communicative partners (and the assumptions that their partners make of them) are a rich base for discourse strategies. By indexing certain beliefs or stances with relation to these assumptions, speakers can indirectly index their affective stance towards particular pieces of information, or even towards their addressees. The forms that do this indexation work are thus highly context-dependant, and require a high degree of concord among speakers in order for their proper production and interpretation. This suggests that their meanings must be relatively under-specified (though of course degrees of this are possible, as I will also demonstrate). In the current chapter, I will show that *ne* and *yo* are in fact such indices, used by speakers to indicate their stance towards the content of their utterances, and thus to their interlocutors.

Consider the particle *ne*. As noted in (1) above, a common characterization of *ne* is that it indexes shared knowledge, is cooperative, and develops a common ground between the speakers. Maynard and Rudolph both claim that it is a "hearer-oriented" particle, the former specifically noting that it marks a request for information to "flow ... to the speaker" (Maynard 1993:208; see also Rudolph 1993:164). From the viewpoint of *expected* versus

[1] Note that this discussion is limited exclusively to the analysis of Japanese modality as expressed in SFFs. Kamio (1997) specifically states that the influence of territoriality is not limited to SFFs, and that its effects can be seen in lexical choice (e.g., *sir-* 'know' vs. *wakar-* 'understand'), information structure (e.g., *it*-clefts, topicalization), demonstrative and personal pronoun use, politeness, and so on. Its validity in these areas of grammar should not be called into question on the basis of the work in this thesis.

actual information, we can say that *ne* marks the speaker's belief that each interlocutor in fact does know what she is expected to know, in particular the addressee of the *ne*-marked utterance. Note however that this is a rather underspecified "meaning"—as will be shown below, however, the complex interpretations that are given to uses of *ne* in context can in fact arise out of this simple assertion.

5.1.1 Simple statements and *ne*

First, there are the typical examples of *ne* recorded above in (2.4) and (3.2b). In the former case, the speaker is communicating a very simple judgement about the weather, which itself is an easily-accesible target of judgement. Importantly, this is a judgement based on what the speaker believes is *commonly* held to be the conditions for "good" weather. By using *ne* to mark her utterance, the speaker is marking the fact that she believes whoever should be expected to "know" this fact (i.e., make the judgement) does in fact know it. If the addressee recognizes the utterance as a communication of a near-universally knowable fact, then he will draw the conclusion that the speaker also believes that he (the addressee) also knows, and is expected to have made, that judgement. By responding in the canonical way (e.g., *soo da ne* 'Yeah, it is'), the addressee can affirm the commonsense stance from which the initial speaker made her statement. This has the effect of creating a sense of common ground and rapport; in other words, this is a prototypical icebreaker. Of course, not all such uses of *ne* are conversation starters. For instance, the speaker of (3.2b) may merely be recognizing that her addressee, who was also watching the news broadcast and is thus expected to be aware of the information uttered, does in fact know that information. Here the affect of the speaker is deprofiled, though of course the addressee may well interpret it as such (that is, as a way to start or maintain a general dialogue about the news, cf. Cook 1990).

The combination indirect-*ne* (Kamio's Case C) requires some further discussion. It is important to realize that the two do not come as a package. The indirect form marks evidentiality or the speaker's certainty of the facts, whereas *ne* marks her stance towards her and her interlocutor's knowledge of those facts. Thus, in the case where the speaker of (3.2b) did not entirely understand the news broadcast, she can even insert a pause between the *rasii* and the *ne*, the latter pronounced with markedly high intonation, indicating a question. Here *ne* marks concordance of expected knowledge (the fact of the pope's visited, which is expected because she was watching the news) and actual knowledge of the information (i.e., the speaker is aware of her own knowledge), but then this "assertion" is questioned (hence the high tone). That is, the gloss is something like 'It looks the new pope is coming next week—

and though I believe that we both know this fact, as we are expected to, I wonder whether in fact that is the case.' The addressee is thus invited to confirm this belief (using *ne*), or deny it. On the other hand, the evidential *rasii* marks the uncertainty of the speaker, as regards *source* and *certainty* of the information, and probably contributes to the questioning aspect of the utterance; note, however, that without the *ne*, the rising intonation, which would fall on the *rasii*, is not acceptible. This also explains (one case) where the "confirmation" meaning of *ne* arises.

The above analysis can also quite easily be extended to cases of the type Okamoto brought up, namely the cases where we might have said that the territoriality is asymmetrical, or, equally, where the speaker is "less involved" than the hearer. Take first the case where the speaker and hearer are (nearly) equally sure of the information: (2.14) is an instance of this. A clearer example is given in (5.2), taken from Okamoto (1996). The situation is that the speaker has walked outside her house after a storm and notices that her neighbor's fence has fallen down. She addresses the neighbor.

(5.2) otaku no kakine, taoreta n desu ne
your.house GEN fence toppled NZ COP *ne*.
'Your fence full down, huh?'

Although this particular use of *ne* is difficult to interpret due to the interaction that it has with the nominalizer *n* (see also (3.4) for a similar complication), its function here is still an assertion of agreement between information the interlocutors are expected to know and information they are actually aware of. Here, however, because there is an inherent difference in involvement (or territory, in the literal sense of the word), there is an even greater degree of expectation on the part of the addressee. That is, while anyone who looks can see that the fence has fallen down, the owner of the fence is by default expected to know the condition of his fence. The speaker of (5.2) can, therefore, use *ne* to show deference towards the addressee, recognizing that he is aware of what he should be aware of. The situation is similar when an evidential must be used, as in Kamio's Case C (see (2.17) above). The evidential indexes the certainty of the speaker (guaranteed to be quite low due to lack of direct evidence) while *ne* acts exactly as described in this section.

In these cases where the content of the utterance deals specifically with something closely related to the addressee, it is convenient to make reference to a concept of territory (or involvement) similar to what Kamio proposes. Namely, information pertaining to a person's property or possessions is considered to be in their territory. However, it is possible to break this down into more basic parts by asking the question: what does it mean to recognize

that something is in another's territory? In the cases where one is commenting on objects or information in another's territory, it is because one expects the other to be able to reply with authority on the topic. Further, the influence of territory in these cases is not to determine the proper linguistic form, but instead to assist speakers in interpreting utterances. That is, a speaker who feels she has the right to claim territory on a particular piece of information (like the addressee of (5.2) above) will interpret the significance of, for instance, her interlocutor's use of *ne* as a marker of recognition of her grasp of facts that she is expected to have at her disposal. This is the type of territory that is significant and that plays a role in linguistic behavior, but it is not exactly the type proposed by Kamio (1998) or Okamoto (1996).

Next, note that the cases above are all those where the speaker is somehow mentioning or asserting the content in the utterance, usually reacting to something in the environment as in the cases with the news broadcast and the fence, and often with the intent of starting a conversation or maintaining an affective common ground from which to further a conversation. However, there is another class of utterances with which *ne* is frequently used, namely statements of facts, a situation often observed in a lecture. Within this class, there are two subcases—the addresse may either be "superficially" aware of the information presented in the utterance, or may totally unaware of it. Both of these uses, I will show, fit within an expected/actual knowledge account of *ne*, although are special in that they are, as Rudolph claims, marked for "positive affect" and are used for rhetoric effect (Rudolph 1993:267).

In the first case, the student is aware of the information being presented, usually in a commonsense fashion, but not in the particular context of the class. Thus although the facts are commonly known, their *significance* is not. Rudolph (1993:241) presents the following utterance by a professor speaking to students in a seminar setting as an example. The topic of the lecture is prototype-based category theory.

(5.3) tatoeba, watasitati ga 'tori' tte iu kategorii ga aru desyo?
for.example 1PL NOM bird QUOTP call category NOM exist isn't it
(listing types of birds) iroiro tori ga imasu ne?
various bird NOM exist *ne*

'For example, we have the category called "bird," right? . . . there are various kinds of birds, right?'

Although the fact that there are various kinds of birds is generally taken to be common knowledge, in the context of a discussion of prototype theory, this fact has new significance. In order for the students to appreciate the professor's argument, they must first understand that within linguistic theory, the mundane facts presented to them take on a new significance.

On the other hand, the professor is attempting to construct an argument, and at each step of the argumentation process she needs to make sure that she and the students are on the same page. By using *ne* in a way similar to that seen in (3.2b) and (2.13), the professor can tell the students to attend to the information being presented as a starting point for developing a common ground-based discourse. The students, by accepting this common ground (and by assuming the effectiveness of Grice's Maxim of Relevance), are then led inevitably to the professor's conclusion, the ultimate goal of the interaction.

The second subcase, where the students are totally unaware of the facts being presented, will be covered in the section below on the SFP *yo*. First, however, I will go in depth into another major class of utterances where *ne* can be seen: the response, where the speaker is reacting specifically to a request for information or confirmation from the addresee. These uses too can be accounted for using a combination of territory and expected/actual knowledge.

5.1.2 Responses and *ne*

There are, broadly speaking, two types of information that can be given as a response: information that is easily-knowable, or which does not necessarily fall under the purview of a particular set of "experts," and information that necessarily falls within some special group of people's territories, and specifically solely within the territory of person doing the responding, i.e., the person of whom the question was asked.

In the first case, the use of *ne* in the response has been frequently noted. The typical example is given below ((5.4), and also (5.5– 5.6) are from Takubo & Kinsui (1997:755))

(5.4) A. ima, nan-zi desu ka?
now what-time COP QP
'What time is it?'

B. (after checking) san-zi desu ne
3-o'clock COP *ne*
'It's 3 o'clock.'

Maynard (1993:207) claims that using *ne* here gives the discourse a "disengaged" feeling, especially when compared with a version that uses *yo* instead of *ne*. This is easily accounted for in the framework I am developing, as long as we allow speakers to have some idea of "easily-knowable" or "commonly-knowable" information. This is information that not everyone is necessarily expected to be aware of at any given time, but that anyone is expected

to be able to find out without any special expertise. It could thus be treated as a type of "expected information." Given that, speaker B could use *ne* to say essentially that as a *result* of his informing speaker A of the time, he has created a situation where speaker A is in fact aware of the information he is expected to know, even though before he heard the response he did not in fact know that information. The effect is that speaker B is saying, "here is the information you requested, though I expect you could have found out yourself."

The second type of information is the person-specific information. This is not information that is known to a specific person due to their training or education, but instead information that personally belongs to an individual, such as their name, age, hometown, and similar information as regards their family and possibly close friends. This is, of course, the same type of information that falls under the rubric of the personal data criterion for territory (see (2.8d) above). To break this instance of territoriality into its constituent parts, everyone is expected to know or be aware of this type of information, and similarly no one expects others to be able to find out this information on their own, except of course by asking the person him or herself. Thus, the situation is precisely the opposite of that in (5.4), and the use of *ne* is predicted to be infelicitous, and in fact it is:

(5.5) A. anata no o-namae wa?
2SG GEN HON-name TOP
'What's your name?'

B. tanaka desu (*ne)
COP *ne*
'It's Tanaka.'

There is of course the case where the person asking the question has simply forgotten what the other's name is, but in this case the information is still not "commonly-knowable," and so the circumstances licensing *ne* do not hold, and *ne* is still infelicitous. In whole, any information that one expects to be private, that is, not known by anyone in particular, cannot be used with *ne*.

There are interesting cases, though, which straddle the boundary between commonly-knowable information and person-specific information. The framework as developed so far predicts that depending on how the speaker wishes to frame his or her knowledge of the information at hand, he will be more or less likely to use *ne*. If the speaker wishes to show that the information is somehow "free to the public," then *ne* will index that stance; an absence of *ne* will emphasize the speaker's closeness to the information. This seems to be the case, as can be seen in (5.6) below:

(5.6) A. anata no nensyuu wa?
2SG GEN income TOP
'What's your yearly income?'

B. ni-hyaku man en gurai desu (ne)
200 10,000 yen about COP (*ne*)
'It's about two million yen.'

In this situation, *ne* is indeed optional, but the speaker who wishes to be humble or to appear not so concerned with his or her salary can use *ne* to create that effect, similar to (5.4). From this example it should be clear that any attempt to account for the uses of *ne* that cannot systematically account for strategic or rhetorical uses is missing a major generalization.

Unfortunately, the uses of *ne* for giving responses (or, more generally, for informing) have further complications, specifically as regards a speaker communicating her future intentions. Consider the following pair of utterances:

(5.7) watasi, (yappari) paatii ni iku ne
1SG (as.expected) party to go *ne*
"Well, I'm going to the party (as I expected would be the case)."

This has been described as being a very strong assertion, something like "I'm going to the party, no matter what you say or do" (Rudolph 1993:160). However, this cannot be an essential property of *ne*, as is evident when the following utterance is examined:

(5.8) watasi, tyotto yuubinkyoku ni itte kuru ne
1SG little.bit post.office to go.and.return *ne*
"I'm going off to the post office for a bit, okay?."

In contrast to (5.7), the usage of *ne* in (5.8) has been described as allowing the addressee the space to contribute his own thoughts. In the above case, the addressee may wish to respond with a request ("Then can you take this package there?"), request confirmation ("So then I'll just keep cooking dinner"), or anything of the like. There is no sense of the speaker of (5.8) intending to communicate defiance. So where do these meanings come from?

One important observation is that an appropriate context for an utterance like (5.8) has the speaker making a decision without the addressee's knowledge, but within the setting of cooperation. The typical case is of a couple at home who must, as part of their daily routine, be aware of the other's whereabouts so that the family can act as a coherent whole. Thus the sharing of information is paramount, and the idea of individual territory may be slightly blurred. This is then an example of a strategic use of *ne*, where the speaker

wants the hearer to attend to the information as though it were information he were both expected and assumed to be aware of. Upon hearing an utterance like the one above, a hearer may think, "Assuming that her going to the post office is not a selfish act, it must be part of a cooperative whole (the family) that everyone ought to be aware of. She just gave me information that would otherwise be solely 'in her territory,' so she is giving me the opportunity to comment on her action." In terms of expected and actual information, in a cooperative environment each agent's ideally is aware of each other agent's intentions, and so others' intentions can be considered expected knowledge. Using *ne* on an utterance that changes the situation so that mutual knowledge is obtained contributes to the cooperative environment: now both are aware of what they are expected to be aware of, and that is the ideal situation.[2]

Similarly, (5.7) can only be felicitously uttered when there has been previous discussion about whether or not the speaker will go to the party. In the typical situation, both the speaker and addressee of the utterance are considering going to the party. Thus the utterance in (5.7) is made against a potentially collaborative background where sharing of information is expected, though it specifically denies the possibility of further collaboration. In this sense, it is nearly identical to the above case where there is the expectation of full openness. Note also that the intonation and length of these two *ne*s are quite different. The one in (5.7) is spoken with a very short vowel and noticeably high pitch. On the other hand, the one in (5.8) has a long vowel and fall-rising intonation. This no doubt clues the hearer in on the exact meaning the speaker wishes to get across. However, it is not clear whether or not these differences in intonation indicate an entirely different lexical item, or if they are composing semantically with a meaning inherent to *ne*. Given that other SFPs, especially *yo* cannot combine with anything near the range of prosodic features that *ne* can, it may be more prudent to call these entirely separate words. However, it seems unlikely that there is *no* systematic relationship between these uses and the others explored so far, and so it is not implausible to place these cases under the current framework. To sum up, these two very different affective stances come out as a consequence of the basic meaning of *ne* along with consideration of the background of the utterance.

Note that in all the above cases we have been able to limit the actual semantic/pragmatic contribution of *ne* to an indexation of agreement between expected information and actually

[2]Another way of conceiving of this situation is to imagine that in inherently (ideally?) cooperative environments, there is the idea of a communal pool of information that includes information about the intentions of the members of the environment *in those cases that the intention is relevant to the functioning of the environment as a whole.* Then (5.8) can be seen as a sort of contribution to the pool.

known information. The discourse context or presense of other linguistic elements (like evidentials or intonation changes) provide the rest of the meaning. Some cases are very subtle, such as one interpretation of the exchange in (3.4). This at first glance seems similar to (5.2) above, but here the response must not contain a *ne*. In order for this to be the case, the gloss of the first utterance would have to be something like "(As is self-evident) you have brought wine, and furthermore I ask you to attend to this information as something not only you but I am expected to know." The implicit belief of the speaker here is that the wine is for the picnic, or fulfils the duty to bring at least one drink to the picnic, or otherwise special. If speaker B interprets A's utterance in this way, then he would simply answer without *ne*. Using *ne* is often the marked option, signalling to the addressee that the speaker is taking some special stance regarding the information uttered. Speaker A is taking a special stance, namely that of wondering whether the wine is of the nature he expects. However, speaker B has no such thoughts, and so the use of *ne* becomes unnecessary or even misleading.[3]

5.1.3 Inquiries and *ne*

There is one final type of utterance where *ne* is commonly seen, and that is in explicit questions. For instance, if a person were to misplace their luggage, or for whatever reason felt unsure as to which piece of luggage among several belonged to him, he might ask of a person likely to know *kono kaban wa watasi no desu ne?* ('This bag is mine, right?'), with question intonation on the *ne*. This use of *ne* has the speaker questioning the assertion being made by *ne*. In other words, the speaker still starts out by stating with *ne* that he is aware of what he is expected to be aware of, but then questions this, essentially asking: "Am I actually correct in assuming that I know this bag is my bag?" This can be contrasted with *kono kaban wa watasi no desu ka* ('Is this my bag?'), with the overt question marker *ka*. Here the speaker is acknowledging the fact that he is unaware of anything about the bag, and not even considering the fact that he should know if it is his bag. This places a higher priority on getting an answer than the version with *ne*, where the speaker may wish to avoid seeming clueless about their own possessions. Thus in this case the underlying function of *ne* remains the indexation of agreement between expected and actual knowledge.

In this section, I have given an analysis of *ne* that systematically accounts for all of the examples raised so far in this paper, as well as several others. This analysis hinges on a

[3]That speaker B may be likely to interpret speaker A's statement in this manner is clear from the fact that he may respond with something meaning "No, no, this is just for my personal use. *This* (pulling out a bottle of soda) is for the picnic," that is, explicitly answering the implicit question.

relatively underspecified gloss for *ne*, spelled out in (5.9) below.

(5.9) The sentence-final particle *ne* indexes the speaker's belief that the interlocutors in the current speech situation are in fact aware or have knowledge of all context-relevant information that they are *expected* to have knowledge of.

Next, I will show that *yo* too can be analyzed in a similar fashion.

5.1.4 Information transfer and *yo*

The sentence-final particle *yo* is often claimed to have an effect "opposite" that of *ne*. That is, where *ne* is cooperative, *yo* is confrontational, and where *ne* is interaction-based, *yo* is information-based (Maynard 1993:208); and where *ne* is hearer-oriented, *yo* is speaker-oriented (Rudolph 1993:167). Within the framework presented in this paper, *ne* has the property of affirming the commonsense assumptions about the correlation between actual knowledge and expected knowledge. Based on this, *yo* would be predicted to mark an opposite stance: namely, that one or all of the interlocutors are *not* aware of information they are expected to be aware of or have access to. In particular, the utterance marked by *yo* should convey information that the addressee does not have any (relevant) awareness of, but that he or she *should* be aware of. This could be called a type of speaker-orientedness, in that the speaker has the power in the relationship—power to distribute information, and power to claim that the addressee is unaware of something he or she should be. It is also clearly a type of informational profiling, in contrast to the relationship- or common ground-profiling uses seen with *ne* above.

The most typical example of *yo*, often glossed as 'you know,' is given below:

(5.10) ame ga hutteiru yo
rain NOM falling *yo*
'It's raining, you know (so take an umbrella when you go out).'

This use of *yo* is characterized by Rudolph (1993:276) as marking information uniquely licensed to the speaker's social role (see (4.2) above). Takubo & Kinsui (2000) characterize *yo* as marking a process of inference on the speaker's side. Both of these seem to capture part of the meaning of *yo*. On the one hand, there is a sense of the speaker claiming unique knowledge or involvement towards the uttered information, but on the other hand the speaker is telling the addressee about the information in order to get them to reason with that information. An appropriate gloss of the typical use would then be "you don't

know this information, but I expect you to (given what I know of your circumstances), and furthermore, you ought to use this information to reason to some highly context-relevant conclusion."

However, not all uses of *yo* have the latter part of this gloss. These are exactly the cases where the information uttered was at some point in the addressee's awareness but at utterance time is not, due to forgetfulness, etc. In this case a speaker can use *yo* to remind the hearer of a fact: *sensee mo kaigi ni irassyaimasita yo* ('You were at the meeting as well, sir, don't you remember?'). Here it is not required that the speaker strongly wishes the addressee to reason about the information. The speaker is in fact giving information to a person who *should* be aware of it, but has already made known the fact that she is not.

Given the above two types of uses, then, if a single conception of *yo* is desired then the "inferring" aspect cannot be part of the basic meaning. However, by appealing to the idea of commonly-knowable information made reference to above, the pragmatic effect of *yo* can be teased out. Namely, by pointing out a fact that is easily accessible to everyone and marking it with *yo*, the speaker can tell an addressee that they have not taken into account some easily identifiable yet important fact. It bears repeating that the addressee of an utterance like (5.10) must not be aware of the fact that it is raining. If it is clear that the addressee knows it is raining, then *yo* is inappropriate. In that type of case, the speaker has other linguistic devices to convey similar intention. One of these is *daroo*, which I will briefly cover in the next section.

Much has been made of the interchangeability of *ne* and *yo* in certain situations. However, the actual variety of cases where these are actually interchangeable seems to be quite narrow. For instance, the utterance *sensee mo irassyaimasita* 'you were there as well, sir,' can be followed by either *yo* (as described above) or *ne*. Both can be used to "give" information to an addressee who is not fully aware of whether they "were there." However, if the addressee has already made it clear that they are *not* sure of the facts, then only *yo* is possible. A clearer case of interchangeability is the response utterance in (5.4), which could be uttered with a *yo* rather than a *ne*. In this case the speaker is framing the information in two different ways: with *ne*, the information is treated as a fact that is commonly-knowable, but that for whatever reason the asker did not want to find out on her own; with *yo*, the speaker becomes more involved in the exchange, marking her awareness that the current time is important to the addressee. It just so happens that the particular type of information being conveyed is compatible with both *ne* and *yo* in most situations.

In summary, I propose the following gloss for *yo*:

(5.11) The sentence-final particle *yo* indexes the speaker's belief that the addressee is *not* aware of some piece of information that she is *expected* to be aware of.

Finally, let us reconsider the special use of *ne* mentioned above, where the speaker is transmitting totally new information to the addressee. The following utterance exemplifies this situation (modified sightly from (29) in Rudolph 1993:239).

(5.12) sandra thompson wa, charles fillmore no desi na n desu ne...
TOP GEN pupil COP NOM COP:POLITE *ne*
'Sandra Thompson is something like Charles Fillmore's' disciple/pupil.

Here the professor has absolutely no expectation that her students would be even aware of this fact, though she no doubt believes that it is valuable information. The question is why this utterance could not take *yo*. Of course, it could, but there is a key difference in presuppositions on the part of the speaker. First, by using *yo*, the speaker reveals a belief that she *expects* the addressee to know or have known this fact. A person about to leave should be aware of the outside weather conditions, as part of a general "going outdoors" scenario. However, very detailed facts about what Rudolph calls the "oral history" of an academic tradition are not an obvious candidate for "expected knowledge," and so the use of *yo* fails on that count. Furthermore, the professor here is not telling the students to engage in some context-relevant reasoning with the information. She is rather providing a piece of trivia that may or may not be of use to the students in their academic careers. The use of *ne*, then, is strategic and very similar to Rudolph's account of it—it creates a sense of leading the students into the academic world, placing them on a somewhat equal level intellectually with the professor (of course, the professor, as the only person licensed to actually give out this information, remains in a position of authority). This use of *ne* is a clear instance of an SFP used strategically to create a positive interactional environment.

5.1.5 Further considerations

There are two independent reasons to believe that the account given of *ne* and *yo* so far is on the right track, even if not correct in the details. The first is related to the sheer variety of uses that *ne* has in relation to other SFPs. The second is related to the phenomenon of soliloquy.

As amply demonstrated throughout this thesis, the uses for and strategies dependent on *ne* are far greater than that of *yo*. The types of situations in which *ne* is available covers

nearly all combinations of "territory," and it can communicate a sense of comeraderie or defiance. Clearly, even allowing for the judicious allotment of meaning to separate lexical items (homophones), the meaning of *ne* is quite nebulous. Compare this with *yo*, whose meaning seems to be roughly the same in most of the uses with which it is commonly associated. This disparity in semantic vagueness suggests a deep difference in inherent meaning, and the account outlined above captures this generalization. A speaker using *ne* is not making any strong claim, but simply affirming what is already expected in the given situation. This weak claim can then take on a variety of meanings in various contexts. On the other hand, a speaker using *yo* is making a very strong claim, namely that some particular person (the addressee) is not aware of some pertinent piece of information. The range of interpretations for a particle like *yo* are thus greatly constrained, and this corresponds to the semantic and pragmatic range of these two particles.

Second, the expected/actual knowledge account is compatible at least in principle, if not in detail, with recent findings regarding soliloquy in Japanese. Hasegawa (2005) has found that in recorded sessions of soliloquy, native speakers of Japanese make frequent use of *ne*, but do not use *yo*. Although this flies in the face of traditional assumptions about the *interactional* nature of SFPs[4], it is not so shocking given the glosses presented above for *ne* and *yo*. Whereas a speaker using *yo* is indexing a piece of information with relation to a specific addressee, a speaker making use of *ne* needs only one speaker for whom the expected/actual knowledge relationship holds. Hopefully future research will shed light on what sort of explanatory framework is necessary to capture the function of *ne* in soliloquy.

5.2 Beyond territory: the case of *daroo*

In this section I would like to more carefully examine some of the uses of *daroo*, often glossed as 'maybe.' Kamio's (1998) framework makes reference to two different situations where *daroo* is "required," but the actual pragmatic effect of *daroo* in these two situations is often quite different. Compare the following utterances.

(5.13) a. ano hito, kimi no mazikare daro?
that person 2SG GEN serious.boyfriend *daroo*
'That guy is your boyfriend, right?'

b. kono kyoku, ii kyoku daroo?
this song good song *daroo*
'Isn't this song nice?'

[4]See in particular Maynard 1993 for a summary of this line of thought.

c. hora, kimi, (yappari) itiban daroo?
look 2sg (as.expected) number.one *daroo*
'Hey, you scored highest, didn't you?'

Looking at the first two sentences alone, which are representative of Kamio's cases of Hearer's and Speaker's prominence, respectively, one can see a sort of commonality between the two uses of *daroo*. In both cases, there is an inequality of territoriality (Kamio's definition) between the speaker and hearer. In (5.13a) it is in the hearer's territory, but in (5.13b) it is mostly in the speaker's territory, and in neither case is it equally in both interlocutors' territories. And, in both cases the speaker is requesting some form of confirmation on the part of the hearer, redundantly[5] marked by the rising intonation on *daroo*, here indicated by a question mark.

However, consider now (5.13c). The situation is that two friends, call them Tanaka and Nakata, are looking together at a bulletin announcing the test scores of a recent college entrance exam. Prior to this, Tanaka had complained to Nakata that the test was difficult, that he was stupid, and would no doubt fail. Nakata, however, told Tanaka that he was not stupid, that he would perform well, and to have some self-confidence. Then, when the two friends go to view the results, they see that miraculously Tanaka has scored at the top of his class. Nakata, noting Tanaka's stunned reaction, utters (5.13c). This is not accounted for at all by Kamio 1998, which predicts Case B, and thus *ne*. To be sure, *ne* is not impossible here, but it is rather unlikely. Furthermore, *ne* certainly does not carry the rhetorical effect of *daroo*, which Nakata uses not only to (vacuously) note that Tanaka has scored high, but to push Tanaka towards reevaluating his intelligence. In fact, this use of rising-intonation *daroo* has a meaning very similar to one of the meanings of *yo*, namely "take this information and reason to some highly context-relevant conclusion." The only difference is that here, the speaker is acutely aware that the addressee is *also* aware of the rank of his score.

What makes this case particulary interesting is the fact that a complementary situation is also possible: Nakata has not been worrying, but bragging that he would probably score top in his class, and Tanaka has been naysaying him, claiming that there are plenty of smarter people in the class. Then, when Tanaka does in fact get the highest score, he can brag *ore, itiban daroo* ('I'm number one, aren't I?'), uttering information about *himself* in an attempt to get Nakata to reason to some conclusion (probably that Tanaka is a really smart guy you shouldn't make fun of). Thus, territory relation to the speaker or hearer can be ruled out

[5] Although native speaker judgements seem to vary, it seems that uttering either of these sentences with falling intonation does not yield the correct reading. Instead they sound like pure conjecture, as in *asita wa ame daroo* ('Perhaps it will rain tomorrow').

as a source of this use of *daroo*.

In fact, it seems that this use of *daroo* cannot be considered to stand in any sort of paradigmatic relationship with *ne*, as claimed by Kamio. However, it does seem that it has a use very similar to the SFP *yo*, and indeed it is possible to show a minimal pair between them. The situation is the same as in (5.13c), except that instead of both Tanaka and Nakata viewing the exam results, only Nakata is there, and he must communicate the results to Tanaka by telephone. In this case, *yo*, but not *daroo* is possible, and further the pragmatic effect of inviting one's addressee to make an inference based on the uttered information is still a possible interpretation. It would then seem that *daroo* is sensitive to a type of evidentiality, though not the same type as *rasii*, *yoo da* and *mitai da*. If it were, then we would expect these words to be able to convey similar pragmatic meaning by adding question intonation; this, however, is not possible.

Kinsui (1992) comes to nearly the same conclusion, stating that *daroo* (both the rising and level intonation varieties) is a marker that signals the speaker's readiness to perform some inference or reasoning on the marked utterance. Although this is not unreasonable *per se*, it seems to me difficult to extract the pragmatic effect out of this simple marker. The hearer would have to hear the utterance with *daroo* and then think "well, he just did some inference with that information, and so he must wish that I do so as well," which is a very roundabout way to get at the right effect. Furthermore, it is questionable that in utterances like (5.13b) and (5.13c) the speaker is in fact performing any inference. This would then be a strategic use of *daroo*, though this is ruled out *a priori* by Kinsui's mental spaces-based model. *Daroo*, then, should be able to provide a rich source of data for the investigation of teh interaction between evidentiality and other forms of discourse modality (Maynard 1993).

Chapter 6

Conclusions and future research

Previous approaches to Japanese modality, particularly that of Kamio (1997), attempted to cover an area of Japanese language use ranging from evidentiality to politeness. However, although all of the phenomena in question are traditionally grouped under the heading of modality, it cannot be stressed enough that the type of modality involved, namely evidentiality, is not a fully-grammaticalized system in Japanese, with parts coming from all lexical categories and contributing a wide range of semantic and pragmatic significance (Aoki 1986:223). It is thus no small feat to claim that one factor—be it territoriality, social role, involvement, or whatever—could be responsible for the distribution of these linguistic forms. Those who do make such a claim tend to approach the problem from one of two viewpoints. Either Japanese modality is primarily a reflection of the inherent relationship between speakers and information, or it is a tool that speakers can use to create the type of conversational environment that best suits their goals.

The theory of territory of information (Kamio 1997, 1998) and information involvement (Okamoto 1996) are two examples of the former variety. Each of these programs starts from an assumption of human territory based on the familiar ethological concept, and attempts to codify the types of territorial behavior that speakers could exhibit with respect to information, and then formally link these behaviors to linguistic forms. This is a very intuitive and powerful conception of linguistic behavior, and indeed Kamio's (1997) framework gives accounts for phenomena in politeness, lexical choice, and information structure in addition to modality. However, as was pointed out in Section 3.3 above, this type of metaphor can easily become a theoretical straightjacket. Not only is the metaphor at times not apt to describe the desired linguistic behavior (What does it mean for some information to be in multiple speakers' territories? Is there joint ownership? A retreat from the information?

Conflict? In general these simply seem to be inappropriate questions to ask of the model), but the complications it causes for multiple senses and rhetorical uses of modal elements seem to be unavoidable.

On the other hand, those programs put forward by discourse analysts, such as the social role model (Chapter 4) have a much easier time dealing with a wide range of seemingly disparate uses for modal particles (and in particular sentence-final particles), and indeed allow for a strict division between evidentials and other modals that is missed in the territory-style frameworks. However, there is always the danger of formulating accounts that fit the target corpus perfectly but that are ill-applied to outside data. The concepts of social roles and new* information capture key ideas of some pragmatic particles like *ne*, but unfortunately emphasize the social aspects so much that even typical examples of these particles require non-intuitive explanations (for instance, it is a stretch to say that a speaker uttering *ii tenki desu ne* ('Nice weather, isn't it?') is using information as a valuable social resource, or that the quality of weather is somehow a social role-licensed piece of information, especially when it is leveraged to start a conversation with a stranger). Just like the territory-style models, a strict adherence to something like the social role model only prevents the analyst from making meaningful characterizations and generalizations.

Therefore, in this paper I have attempted to take a middle-of-the-road approach to Japanese modality, noting that some types of modality, like evidentiality, are close to obligatory in many cases, whereas other types, like informational stance-taking *ne* and *yo*, lend themselves to strategic and other "optional" uses. I took the concept of discourse strategy as a primary factor in the usage and interpretation of sentence-final particles, starting with the idea that speakers can select special forms like evidentials and SFPs specifically in order to advance their conversational or interactional goals. Their choices would, of course, be limited by other considerations, such as territoriality and politeness. Nevertheless, given a desire to affect the addressee, either to persuade them to have certain beliefs or to push them towards a cooperative or collaborative stance, or to simply inform them of one's own mental state, the speaker will take maximum advantage of whatever strategies are provided her *in addition to* whatever other contextual and presuppositional methods are already present. It is with this in mind that I considered what an appropriate account of Japanese modality should be. Of course, there is always the danger of providing so vague a characterization that one overpredicts the uniformity of a class of lexical items—in other words, lumping where splitting would be more appropriate. Striking a balance between the two is not a simple task. Hopefully I have shown that by taking into account the rich background against which

speakers make even the simplest utterances—background *including* ideas like social role and territoriality—even simple characterizations for sentence-final particles can yield a wealth of semantic and pragmatic interpretations that are nonetheless coherent and systematic.

I conclude by admitting that there remains a plentitude of data to be accounted for, especially regarding *ne*, and it is likely the case that there are several other uses of SFPs that cannot be accounted for by *any* of the frameworks presented in this paper. Only a few can be raised here. First, consider utterances like the following, likely to be uttered by a mother to her child who has just injured himself.

(6.1) itai ne
hurt *ne*
'It hurts, I know.'

Many other similar utterances are well-known as examples of the affective common ground-expressing *ne*, but these are special in that they are generally only appropriate when speaking to a child. The mother is seen as speaking from the point of view of the child in some way. This nuance of *ne* has not, to my knowledge, been adequately explicated in the literature.

Second, there are combinations of *ne* with other SFFs, forming even more complex forms like *yo-ne*, *no-ne*, *ka-ne*, and so on. Although both Rudolph (1993) and Takubo & Kinsui (2000) claim to have shown that they are compositional in nature, their meanings must be reconsidered in the light of the data presented in the present work. Particularly, there are very subtle differences in the appropriateness of *yo-ne* versus *ne* in various politeness-sensitive contexts that are very difficult to pin down, and it seems as though a purely compositional analysis will run into some serious problems. Additionally, there are uses of *ne* that are not sentence-final but interjective, and it is an open question as to whether these should even be considered the same lexical item as sentence-final *ne*. Indeed, it is possible that the *ne* used in argumentation (see (5.3) above) could be related to this more "narrative" use of *ne*, though further investigation is required before anything substantive can be claimed. If the line of thought and methodology followed in this thesis is on the right track, however, then more than anything else the intentions and goals of speakers engaged in verbal interaction must be considered when faced with a wide range of seemingly disparate data.

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