

Santa Cruz Lectures on Deixis
1971

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Santa Cruz

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

These lectures were given at the 1971 summer linguistics program at the Santa Cruz campus of the University of California, while I was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. In those days I thought of my deixis lectures as a preview to a book that was in the making. I now realize, unhappily, that since a year at the Center, away from classrooms and committees, did not give me the time and the wisdom to finish it, the book is never going to be written.

Revised versions of two of the lectures -- the first and the fifth -- have already appeared in public. I am unhappy about having the rest appear in their present form, but in any attempt to improve and update this material I would not know where to start, and I would certainly not know where to stop. But I can say of the non-existent enlarged improved integrated updated version of these lectures that (1) they would show more of the influence of David Bennett, Eve Clark, Herbert Clark, Paul Friedrich, Geoffrey Leech, John Lyons, Michael Silverstein, Leonard Talmy, and Paul Teller, and that (2) they would show the benefit of at least one more visit (if I would be welcomed) to the members of the Mexican branch of the Summer Institute of Linguistics who, in December of 1970, submitted patiently to my interviews with them, about "their" languages, when I visited SIL workshops in Mitla and Ixmiquilpan.

Charles J. Fillmore
Berkeley
November, 1975

DEIXIS II

My last general lecture on deixis dealt with place deixis and time deixis. Today I will take up the topics of discourse deixis and social deixis. I will begin with the former.

Discourse deixis has to do with the choice of lexical or grammatical elements which indicate or otherwise refer to some portion or aspect of the ongoing discourse -- something like, for example, "the former". Most commonly, the terms of discourse deixis are taken from systems of deictic and non-deictic time semantics, for the very good reason that any point in a discourse can be thought of as a point in time -- the time at which that portion of the discourse is encoded or decoded -- with preceding portions of the discourse conceived as occurring earlier in time, later portions thought of as occurring later in time. Expressions in discourse deixis taken directly from non-deictic time semantics are words like "earlier" and "later", and phrases like "the preceding X" and "the following X". That is, an expression like "in the following paragraph" is analogous to "on the following day".

A point in the development of a discourse can be taken as the coding time, so that such deictic time notions as the oriented tenses are completely appropriate for discourse-deictic locutions. "In the last paragraph we saw ..." is an example with the discourse point taken as general coding time; "in the next paragraph I will show ..." is an example using encoding time; and "in the last chapter you saw that ..." is an example using decoding time.

The deictic time expressions "this", "next" and "last" that are appropriate for portions of discourse are those that are appropriate for calendar units in the time semantics. "In the last paragraph" is like "last week"; "in the next chapter" is like "during the next month"; and "This sentence contains five words" is a little like "This week contains three legal holidays".

There are a few discourse-deictic elements which are peculiar to written discourse. Examples are "above" and "below" in English, or their equivalents in Japanese, "izyoo" and "ika". The image in both the English case and the Japanese case is based on the written language, but the two languages differ in acceptability of the written-language form in spoken discourse. In Japanese formal speech-making, the words "izyoo" and "ika" are quite appropriate; but in English the only people allowed to refer to what they have just said as "the above" are those irritating professors who insist on reading their lectures to class.

The word "this" has the function I mentioned above, as in a sentence like "This sentence contains five words", which was said to be like the use with deictic calendric time units. A special function that it has in speech is similar to the visual gestural use in a sentence like "Hers was about this big"; what I have in mind is the use of a sentence like "She spoke about this loud", a sentence in which the degree of loudness of its performance constitutes the demonstration referred to by the demonstrative.

The demonstratives "this" and "that" have additionally their uses in referring to an immediately preceding and an immediately following portion of the discourse, respectively. The phenomenon is not limited to discourse, but to anything at all occurring close to the coding time -- either something which the speaker performs or some happening which is observable at the same time by encoder and decoder. Thus, I can introduce my frog act, or I can introduce my explanation of something, by saying "This is my imitation of a frog" or "This is my explanation" respectively; similarly, I can post-announce my frog act or my explanation by saying something like "That was my imitation of a frog" or "That was my explanation". It seems to me that there is much in common with this particular usage and the distinction between the coreferentiality use of "this" and "that" by which, with "this" the idea is that one of the participants knows what it is that is being referred to but the other does not, and with "that" it is assumed that both encoder and decoder know what is being talked about. A passage with "this" in the function just mentioned is:

I met a friend of yours last night. Well, this guy told me some pretty interesting things about you.

A passage with "that" in the "both-of-us-know" function is:

Remember the man who sold us those football tickets?
Well, that guy told me ...

The forward-pointing and backward-pointing demonstratives of discourse deixis are similarly distinguished, I think, because when I say (just before giving my explanation) "This is my explanation", I know what it is but you don't; but when I say "That was my explanation", we both know what it is.

This is true in general, but the distinction is obscured by the fact that "this" also has, more so in some dialects than in others, a backward-pointing function as well as a forward-pointing function. The backward-pointing function was illustrated in the first clause of the last sentence. There appear to be tense restrictions of some sort associated with the use of "this" as opposed to "that" in backward-pointing discourse deixis, as is suggested by the fact that it is more acceptable to say "This has been an interesting course" or "That was a brilliant lecture" than to say "This was an interesting course" or "That has been a brilliant lecture" when spoken by me to my professor immediately after his penultimate lecture.

In cases where a preceding portion of a discourse contains a list of two items, many languages have special devices for referring to the elements in the list. In English we have the words "the former" and "the latter". In a number of other languages -- including French and German -- the demonstratives have that function, the proximal demonstrative used to mean "the latter", the distal demonstrative used to mean "the former".

In discourse deixis there are also sometimes special ways of referring to the encoder or the decoder, but this, I would guess, has more to do with gentility conventions about personal references in writing than with grammatical realities that should be of interest to us here. There is not much more, gentle reader, to say about discourse deixis, in the opinion of the present author, than what has already been said. (It occurs to me that it ought to be fairly easy for people to figure out how much of this lecture was delivered orally and how much was added in the writing up.)

The subject of discourse deixis can lead fairly naturally to the subject of discourse analysis, and that, in turn, can lead naturally to our next topic, social deixis.

A typical view of discourse analysis has it that its goal is the presentation of the total design of a text. That aspect of discourse analysis which gets suggested by the 'moving finger' or 'moving coding time' idea emphasizes the need for a technique which will allow the analyst to characterize the discourse at any point in its development. For example, it ought to be possible to choose any point in a discourse, to identify the current message, to specify what is being communicated at this point, what is being presupposed, which of its presuppositions are established in earlier portions of the discourse, which of its presuppositions are challenged or revised in later portions of the discourse, and so on.

And where discourse analysis of the sort I have in mind is applied to samples of conversation, the kinds of observations the analyst will find himself making will lead directly to a consideration of social deixis.

The analysis of conversation can be carried on at two levels: the one I will call external, the other internal. The external analysis of conversation deals with the mechanics of conversation -- the pacing, the manner of choosing the next speaker, the pausing between and within contributions to the conversations, the devices that are used for initiating and terminating a conversation, the ways in which clearance cues are issued which allow the listening members of a conversational group to know that the 'floor' is clear, the ways in which a participant knows that it is his 'turn' to speak, and so on. The study of these sorts of things belong more appropriately, I would guess, to such other disciplines as the ethnography of communication, the sociology of small-group interaction, ethnomethodology, Victor Yngve's 'state-of-mind theory' [Victor Yngve, "On getting a word in edgewise," Papers of the Sixth Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 1970, pp. 567-577], and interaction chronography [Joseph Jaffe and Stanley Feldstein, Rhythms of dialogue, Academic Press, 1970], than to linguistics proper; but I feel sure that linguistics can profitably draw from these studies in many ways.

After three tries, the newsman stops retrieving the same ball and takes out another one. This one has the same fate.)

The external analysis of conversation deals with such matters as: when does one participant decide to make a contribution to the conversation; how does he gain the attention of the other participants; how does a participant know when it's his turn; what does he do to guarantee that he will have a turn; how does a participant change the topic; how does the conversation get terminated; and so on.

Any of these topics offers enormous possibilities for research, and the people who work in these areas can sometimes find a great deal to say about what superficially looks like extremely small matters. Take, for example, the English greeting "hello" and the hesitation-pause utterance "uh".

Harvey Sacks, the ethnomethodologist at Irvine, has a great deal to say on the function in conversation of the hesitation-marker "uh". He has noticed that participants in a conversation are less tolerant of pauses if the pauses occur between two successive contributions to the conversation than if they occur within one person's contribution. The main function of "uh" is to signal "it's my turn" ("my ball is in the air"). In the middle of a contribution, the "uh" indicates that the current speaker has more to say and that the pause is not to be construed as indicating that his speech has ended. At the beginning of a contribution to the conversation, the "uh" has the function of claiming the floor. If you speak to me and I say "uh", I am indicating to you that I'm going to take my turn, but you have to wait until I think of what I want to say.

(One way of checking out the functional importance of this turn-holding syllable is to do something which violates the expectations that are associated with its normal use. I once conducted an experiment with my linguistics colleagues at Ohio State during a luncheon faculty meeting. In the middle of the meeting I said "uh", and everybody else remained silent, waiting for me to say something. I happened to be chewing food at the time, so I pointed to my cheeks and went on chewing. My conversation partners waited while I finished chewing, and looked toward me expectantly when I finally swallowed. I then took another forkful of food and resumed eating. The reaction indicated to me that having said "uh", I had claimed the floor, so the people I was in conversation with had the right to expect me eventually to have something to say. By violating that expectation, I offended some people and amused others; and we all became aware of one of the techniques of conversational interaction that can be used unfairly.)

Apparently the length of the pause that is tolerated between one person's contribution to the conversation and the next person's varies from culture to culture, and, I would expect, from individual to individual. I have heard of several cases of cross-cultural difficulties between native speakers of English and speakers from other cultures in which conversational pacing is at a more reduced tempo. The speaker of

English frequently feels the need to say over again what he has just said, on the theory that his interlocutor's silence is due to a problem of hearing or attention.

A particularly interesting study of one aspect of the mechanics of conversation is Emanuel A. Schegloff's "Sequencing in conversational openings" [*American Anthropologist*, Vol. 70, 1968, pp. 1075-1095], derived from his dissertation The first five seconds. The study is about the mechanics and functioning of the summoning and answering elements at the beginning of a telephone conversation -- what we might refer to as the establishing of person-deictic anchoring. One of the interesting observations that Schegloff makes about English is that certain problems of communication over the telephone are enhanced by the fact that the word "hello" is used both as a summons and as an answer to a summons. When there's a bad connection, one person shouts "hello" and what he gets back is a lot of noise and the sound of the other person shouting "hello". He doesn't know, if he assumes the connection is bad for both partners, whether the "hello" he has just heard is an answer to his summons, in which case it's his turn to say what he wanted to say, or whether the person's "hello" is a summons, in which case he must say "hello" as an answer to that summons. If our language had separate words for calling and responding, like "chemdoo" and "boogee", such a problem could not come up.

By the internal analysis of conversation I mean, on the one hand, the analysis of what conversation partners are doing to each other by means of their contributions to the conversation and, on the other hand, the devices by which the utterances that speakers produce establish or reflect information about the identity of the conversation partners, the nature of the social context, or the social relations between the partners. The former has to do with conversation rules in the sense of Paul Grice, Bill Labov, and the Lakoffs, as well as the principles for characterizing speech acts in the style of John Searle; and the latter is social deixis. The two are obviously closely related, since the sorts of considerations one needs to pay attention to in describing speech acts and the various types of conversational exchanges include all of what one needs to keep in mind for descriptions of social deixis.

(The ways in which the quality of conversation is affected by whether or not social deictic anchoring is established is well understood by the leaders of a social movement that has drawn a great deal of attention to itself in recent years, especially here in California, namely the encounter group movement. One of the techniques used by the practitioners of this movement is that of urging its participants to limit their discourse to sincere person-deictically anchored sentences in which the reference time is identical to the coding time. (They have, as you may know, less accurate ways of describing it, but there is no doubt that the use of this technique has drawn heavily from recent advances in deictic theory.) The way it works is something like this: One of the participants says something like "life is rotten." The leader, on hearing this, says that the participant has failed to produce a sentence which satisfies the anchoring

criteria. The participant tries again, this time changing it to "I am telling you now that life is rotten." The leader explains that the criteria for producing a person-deictically anchored sentence are not satisfied merely by making the performative level explicit. The participant tries again, this time saying "My life is rotten." The leader gets him this time on the truthfulness and reference-time criteria. "Here you are," he says, "drinking organic apple juice, soaking in a hot tub, surrounded by people who love you, and you tell us that your life is rotten. How can you expect us to believe you?" Through a few more exchanges of this sort, the leader gradually gets the participant to create a sincere fully centered utterance, which is usually something like "I want you to feel sorry for me. Please come and give me a hug." At last he has produced a sentence which established a relationship between speaker and addressee that is relevant to the moment of speech.)

Social deixis, then, is the study of that aspect of sentences which reflect or establish or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in which the speech act occurs. The places to look in a language for information on social deixis include: the devices for person marking, such as the pronouns of English and most other languages; the various ways of separating speech levels, as seen, for example, in the distinctions found in so many of the languages of East Asia between plain, polite, honorific and humble speech; formal distinctions in utterances of various types that depend on certain properties of the speech act participants, as shown, for example, in the imperative sentences in Biloxi, as described by Mary Haas [in this language, imperative sentences have separate forms depending on whether they are spoken by a male to an adult male, by a female to an adult male, or whether it is spoken by anybody to an adult female, or by anybody to a child. Mary R. Haas, "Men's and women's speech in Koasati," 1944, reprinted in Hymes, D. H., Language in Culture and Society, 1964]; the various ways in which names, titles, and kinship terms vary in form and usage according to the relationships among the speaker, the addressee, the audience and the person referred to; the various ways in which linguistic performances can count as social acts, as in insults, greetings and expressions of gratitude; the ways in which linguistic performances can accompany other social acts, such as the "There you go," of the waitress and the "Upsy daisy" of the playful father; and, lastly, the various devices that a language provides for a speaker to be able to establish and maintain a deictic anchoring with a given addressee.

This description, as you see, absorbs what I earlier called person deixis, as well as many aspects of the external analysis of conversations and many aspects of the analysis of speech acts.

In studying social deixis, there are various approaches that one could take. I could begin, for example, by considering grammatical forms of a particular type and exploring their functioning in conversation and the social contexts in which their use might be considered

appropriate. For example, we could consider the set of pronouns which a language has, or the greeting patterns that exist in the language community, and talk about the speech-act functions in which these play a role as well as the social contexts which limit or determine their appropriateness. Or instead we could take the various speech functions, such as attention-calling, thanking, identifying oneself, referring to one's addressee, etc., and, for each of these, talk about the various forms which serve this function under specific social conditions. Or, thirdly, we could take specific defined social contexts, as, for example, a conversation between two high-status individuals who have not met each other before, and discuss the linguistic forms which are appropriate in this context for carrying out the various possible speech-act functions which conversations between these two individuals could be said to exemplify. In one way or another, I will be using each of these approaches.

Suppose we begin with pronouns. In English, the words for identifying the speaker and the addressee of a conversation are simple "I" and "you", with somewhat more variety possible if the speaker is a Quaker or if the addressee is a divinity. Another complexity, to be sure, is found in the so-called first-person-plural pronoun "we", but we have already talked about that. I mentioned that it is ambiguously inclusive or exclusive of the addressee, and I discussed something about contexts in which it does not get disambiguated. There are one or two other things worth saying about this pronoun, one being that in its singular use -- its use on the part of editors, clergymen and royalty -- the grammatical rules of English sometimes recognize it as singular, sometimes as plural. The verb agreement processes treat it as plural, the choice of the reflexive morpheme treats it as singular: the reflexive form of singular "we" is "ourself" and not "ourselves". Another fact about English "we" that should be mentioned is that the group of individuals included in the scope of the pronoun need not all be human. In English, but not in certain other languages, it's possible for me to ask "May we come in?" when I'm speaking for me and my pet beaver.

Japanese, by comparison with English, offers a lot more variety. There are in that language a great many person-indicating words, the choice among which depends on such factors as age, sex and social status of the conversation participants; the social relationships that hold between them; the degree of intimacy or formality of the conversation; and combinations of these factors.

To look at some examples that might be closer to home, let's take the case of the formal and informal second person pronouns that we find in so many European languages. Following the justly famous study of Brown and Gilman [Roger Brown and Alfred Gilman, "The pronouns of power and solidarity," in Thos. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in language, MIT Press, 1960, pp. 253-276] we can use the symbols *T* for the informal pronoun and *V* for the

formal pronoun. The pronouns referring to the addressee have both symmetric and asymmetric uses in two-party conversations. The symmetric cases include that in which two people exchange T and that in which two people exchange V, the asymmetric case is the case in which one person gives the other person T but receives V from him. What the Brown and Gilman study has shown is that even in language communities which are as much in contact with each other as the French, German and Italian, the social conditions calling for one or another of the pronoun usage patterns differ a great deal. (For details, see their article.)

According to an extremely interesting study of pronominal usage in 19th century Russian novels by Paul Friedrich ["Structural implications of Russian pronominal usage," in Wm. Bright, ed., Sociolinguistics, Mouton, 1966], there are ten factors which determine the appropriateness of one or another of the pronominal usage patterns. These are: the topic of conversation, the social context, the age or sex or generation of the conversation partners, the kinship relationship between the partners, shared membership in a dialect or social group, the possession of relative jurial or political authority on the part of one of the participants, and the degree of emotional solidarity between the two. What Friedrich was particularly interested in in his study was an analysis of the phenomenon he called "breakthrough", the process of changing, as a concomitant of a changing social relationship between the two individuals involved, from one pronominal usage pattern to another.

Certain sorts of changes in these patterns do not count as breakthroughs in this sense, being determined instead by one of the other factors. The case where army officers will exchange V while talking about military matters and will later exchange T when their conversation is social is a case that is accounted for by the factor of 'topic of conversation'. An example of a breakthrough, on the other hand, is found when two officers exchanging T while having a drink together will suddenly switch to V when one of them feels insulted and issues a challenge to a duel. The sudden loss of emotional solidarity between them is reflected in the switch from exchanging T to exchanging V.

Pronominal usage breakthroughs can occur when people are establishing a new degree of intimacy in their relationship, in which the pattern becomes one of exchanging T. When a newly defined social equality is set up between two people, they can switch from the asymmetric pattern to the pattern of exchanging T. Insults can arise either by switching from V to T or by switching from T to V. A switch from V to T can indicate that the speaker withdraws respect from his addressee; a switch from T to V can indicate that the speaker rejects previous assumptions of emotional solidarity with his conversation partner.

There is sometimes a long period of fluctuation in a breakthrough. One of the types of breakthrough that occurred in Friedrich's material was what is found in the conversations of partners in a love affair.

During the period when the new relationship is not yet firmly established, there is unease and fluctuation in the use of the pronouns. This unease comes from the fear of committing one or another of the pronoun-switching insults. One partner fears that if the other expects T and receives V, he will think that the move toward greater intimacy is being resisted; on the other hand, he fears that if the other expects V and receives T, somebody is being a bit presumptuous. The pronoun usage fluctuation, and the accompanying unease, with people who are redefining their relationship is that of not knowing what the other person's expectations are.

One interesting question related to the use of pronouns in those languages which provide a two-way distinction of the sort I have been discussing is whether the users of the language do or do not have any clearly defined way of using the pronouns in conversations with God. I talked about this with some SIL missionary linguists in Mexico and found that in some of the Indian languages of Mexico it is completely obvious to the speakers that God must be addressed as T; to others it is completely obvious that God must be addressed as V. Things are not that certain for other languages. Until recently, if you addressed God as "tu" or "vous" in French, it depended on whether you were a Protestant or a Catholic. In short, to restate the theme of the Brown and Gilman study, knowing merely that a language has a distinction between two second-person pronouns of the type called formal and informal is not at all the same as knowing what the social and emotional significance of the use of these forms might be.

The sort of breakthrough that Friedrich studied in connection with Russian pronominal usage is, of course, not limited to pronouns. There are other devices by which the participants in a conversation call or refer to each other besides the use of pronouns, and conditions very similar to those involved in the choice of pronouns in the studies of Brown and Gilman and Friedrich are also involved in the ways in which names and titles and kinship terms are used.

An example of a symmetric way of exchanging names is that by which both partners use first names, or that by which both partners use a title and the family name. An example of an asymmetric usage is the case where one calls the other by his first name but is addressed by the other with his title and last name.

Here, too, there are the same sorts of difficulties in switching from one pattern to another. Let's suppose, for example, that I have always called you Dr. Smedlap, and you have always called me Herschel. It happens that once an asymmetric naming usage has been established between two individuals, it is very difficult to change. Certain ways of bringing about the change are more difficult than others. As the one who has been at the lower end of the relationship all these years, I would find it difficult to initiate a change in either direction. It would be presumptuous of me to say "Dr. Smedlap, would you mind if I called you Sam from now on?" and it would be difficult in another way if I were to say to you "Instead of calling me Herschel, I'd prefer it

if you called me Dr. Bramble from now on."

But initiating a change would be difficult for you, too. One of the things that people do in conversation, especially in the English-speaking world, is to maintain stratification masking. If you say to me, "Please call me Sam instead of Dr. Smedlap", the very act of saying that is an acknowledgement of the social difference that exists between us, and that is what would make it difficult for you. The change to less formality can be made easy, however, if you decide to make a joke about it. "Hey, man, let's cut this 'doctor' bit. My name is Sam." That would do it, but this time, the very act of making a joke about it might be seen as implying a greater degree of emotional solidarity than you would like. You might not want to get that close to Herschel Bramble.

With these last examples I've been concerned mostly with terms of address. Similar problems exist with terms of third-person reference where the choice of an appropriate term depends on the sorts of social relationships that obtain among the speaker and the addressee and the person referred to. The situation comes up as an embarrassment, most typically, whenever the gentleman is expected to order dinner in a restaurant for his companion. Suppose I am in an elegant restaurant and the waiter comes up, looking at me, and asks if I am ready to order. Since in the English of people over thirty the use of a personal pronoun as a term of first reference is considered rude, I would find it difficult to say "She's going to have a cheeseburger." The clause has to have a subject, but the alternatives also seem awkward. The versions "My wife will have a cheeseburger" or "Mrs. Willoughby here will have a cheeseburger" are awkward because of the fact that it seems inappropriate and unnecessary for somebody to introduce his wife, or Mrs. Willoughby, even, to the waiter in a restaurant.

I have tried to find out what different people do in this situation, and I have come across a number of solutions. There are some men who would avoid the dilemma by speaking to the companion, expecting the waiter to overhear their conversation: "Let's see, you wanted the cheeseburger with everything, right?" Another solution is for him to order for himself whatever it is that she wants: "That'll be two cheeseburgers, please." A better solution is for him to order the same thing for both of them, and then change his mind about his own order: "That'll be two cheeseburgers. No, on second thought, make mine a carrot-and-raisin salad." The most common solution, according to a waitress I interviewed, is a strange kind of pretended formality using the phrase "the young lady". But it's also common for people to make a joke out of it: "Her ladyship will have one of your superb cheeseburgers." My point is that for people who sense the various nuances of terms of personal reference, there is no easy or natural or 'unmarked' way of choosing a third-person subject for sentences of the type you need for ordering somebody else's dinner. (There are, therefore, good sociolinguistic reasons for supporting W. L., in addition to all the other reasons. She can order her own meal.)

Kinship terms, used for personal reference, have different versions depending on the relationship between the speaker and his addressee. The use of a possessive pronoun with a kinship term, or kinship term plus name, depends on whether or not the two partners in the conversation belong (in reality or symbolically) in the same family. Postal has talked about this somewhere. A child refers to a certain woman as "Mommy" when he is talking to somebody who is a member of the same family, somebody like his father or his big sister, but when he is talking to somebody outside of his family, he must say "My mommy". In Japanese one tends to use the honorific or honorific-endearament kinship terms when talking to members of one's own family, but the humble equivalent when talking to people outside of the family.

In English, the assumptions associated with the use of a possessive pronoun with a kinship term allow the possessive to be used insincerely in some cases, cases where the relationship is perfectly clear but the speaker, probably as a joke, wishes to act as if one or another of the partners does not have the mentioned relationship to the individual referred to. I have in mind conversations between husband and wife about young daughter Peggy. When Peggy does something particularly praiseworthy, the father says to the mother, "Look at what my daughter did." When Peggy does something offensive, however, the command becomes, "Look at what your daughter did."

Attention-calling is carried out in different ways depending upon whether a person with whom one wishes to establish person-deictic anchoring is known or unknown and whether the discourse is polite or impolite. Some general titles can be used for attention-calling, others cannot. "Miss" can be used in polite attention-calling, "Mister" in impolite attention-calling, but "Mrs." not at all. The pronoun "you" can be used, but it is impolite. When the addressee is known to the speaker, a name or more specific title than Mr. or Miss is appropriate. The choice between a name or a title depends on the relationship between the partners, and certain informal titles may depend on various combinations of factors. "Doc", as claimed by Erving Goffman, combines deference and male solidarity, for example.

Titles can be used for address or third-person reference in English, but in many languages they can also be used for second-person reference. Sometimes there are separate forms for address and reference, as between "the Reverend" and "Reverend". Sometimes people use titles for identifying themselves, but there appears to be both social class and individual variation in this. Many people use the title "Mr." when talking about themselves ("I'm Mr. Jones"), while many others could never imagine themselves doing that. The title "Dr." is always used in self-identifying by medical

doctors, but usually not by holders of other sorts of doctorates. If you hear somebody say "I'm Dr. Smith" you can usually assume that he's either a medical doctor or an education school professor.

There are many ways of referring to people which can best be thought of in terms of the speaker's taking the addressee's point of view. In particular in conversation with small children, the words used for identifying members of the child's family are the words that it would be appropriate for the child to use. A mother, thus, when talking to her small child, will refer to herself as "Mommy", to her brother Will as "Uncle Willy", to her father as "Grandpa", and so on, each time taking the word which would be appropriate for the child to use rather than the word which would be appropriate for her to use. In referring to the child, the child's name is sometimes used, but if a pronoun is used, it is always "you", the pronoun that takes the speaker's point of view. A Japanese mother will refer to her small son, when talking to him, as "boku".

A different sort of thing occurs in the peculiar symmetric naming pattern between parents and children that occurs in Arabic, as I have learned from Charles Ferguson. In this case the pattern is not limited to conversation with children. A woman's children call her "Mama" but she also calls each of them "Mama". A man's children call him "Baba", but he, symmetrically, calls each of them "Baba" too.

There are several different ways in which, for the establishment of person-deictic anchoring, the speaker identifies himself to the addressee. The various patterns in English can be illustrated by "It's me", "This is Chuck Fillmore", "I'm Chuck Fillmore", "My name is Chuck Fillmore". The order I've listed them in reflects a range in how easily the addressee can identify the speaker. In the case of "It's me", my addressee must know me well enough to be able to recognize my voice. It's something that I would use only when the sound of my voice is the only evidence you have as to my identity: I'm talking on the telephone, or my hair turned gray overnight and I no longer look like my old self. At the other extreme, if I say "My name is Chuck Fillmore" I have no reason to assume that you have ever heard of me before. The one with "this" is particularly interesting. The conditions under which it is appropriate for me to introduce myself with the locution "This is Chuck Fillmore" seem to be these: (i) the communication is by voice (i.e., not by a letter, say); (ii) the communication situation is not face-to-face; and (iii) I have reason to believe that you will recognize the name. This way of introducing oneself is appropriate over the telephone, over the radio, or on television. Sometimes on television, the pretense is made that the performer/audience relationship is face-to-face, so it is just as appropriate to say "This is Walter Cronkite" as it is to say "I am Walter Cronkite", but the former is more appropriate over the radio. The requirement that the conversation be face-to-face is not the requirement that the individuals see each other, because people meeting each other in total darkness would not use the expression with

"this", nor would blind people. I would not call up some complete stranger, somebody who had no reason to know my name, and begin our conversation with "This is Chuck Fillmore." I have noticed that some telephone salespeople make use of the presupposition unfairly. About three times in the past year I've received phone calls from salespeople who begin their pitch with "Hello Charles, this is Harry Schwartz." If the conversation had not begun with an appropriate term of address, I would have suggested right away that he had the wrong number. The introduction with "this", however, added to the near appropriateness of the "Hello, Charles" had the effect of making me think that this was somebody that I was supposed to know. Out of embarrassment, I would listen to him much longer than I would have if I had known instantly that it was a sale pitch.

(Remember that the "this" of the participant-identifying locutions was one of those words that switched roles between assertions and questions. "This is Harry Schwartz" means "I am Harry Schwartz", but -- in American English, but apparently not in British English -- "Is this Harry Schwartz?" means "Are you Harry Schwartz?" In Britain one would say "Is that Harry Schwartz?" and would regard the question "Is this Harry Schwartz?" as a part of a guessing game. It's conceivable that this use of "this" is a way of taking the addressee's point of view, because it is not appropriate in combination with a clear addressee-indicating pronoun like "you". It's okay to say "Is that you, Harry?" but not "Is this you, Harry?" when trying to get the person on the other end of the line to tell you who he is.)

The phenomenon of 'taking the other fellow's point of view' has come up two or three times in these lectures, and it might be interesting now to summarize the sorts of things which serve this function and to add one or two observations that have not been brought up before.

I mentioned today the special use of kinship terms when talking to children, terms which are those the child would use, not those the speaker would ordinarily use. And I also mentioned the addressee-referring use of Japanese "boku", a boy's word for "I".

I mentioned in an earlier lecture that I had learned from Don Stuart that in the Mazahua language of Mexico, a language in which the movement verbs of the "come" pattern refer basically to motion toward a location identified with the speaker, there is a special way of switching the place-deictic center from the speaker to the addressee in deferential language. Ordinarily one would say "I am here and people come to me. You are there and people go to you." But in deferential uses of language, as in some letters Stuart has received, one uses the place deictic words with the poles reversed,

as if 'You are here, people come to you. I am over there, people go to me.' William Gedney has told me that in Thai this switching of deictic centers is possible in letter writing but not in other forms of communication. If you invite me over to your house and I accept the invitation in Thai, my answer will be something like "I will go there" if I give it over the telephone, something like "I will come here" if I get it to you by mail.

The shift of the place deictic center in letter-writing in some languages is analogous to the way in which the authors of writings can identify the time-deictic center with the time in which the material is being read as opposed to the time at which it is being written. That is, if I am writing to you I can let the central time for the tense system of my sentences be either the time I am writing the letter or the time you are reading. Suppose, for example, that I write you a letter before you take your vacation, and I know that you will receive the letter after you return. If I say "I hope you have a good vacation", I have taken writing time as central, but if I say "I hope you had a good vacation", I have taken reading time as central. In English letter-writing conventions there are generally both possibilities, but apparently if the writer's current activities are mentioned in the letter, the writing time needs to be central. In the epistolary Latin of Cicero, by way of contrast, this was not necessary because the writer's activities at writing time were by convention assigned a past tense, the time that is past to the writing time assigned the pluperfect tense. [See Robin Lakoff's recent article, "Tense and its relation to participants," Language Vol. 46, 1970, pp. 838-849.]

It has seemed to me from time to time that the gestural use of certain demonstratives is different depending on whether the speaker takes his own point of view or the addressee's. I suggested earlier that in cases of precise indication, the proximal/distal opposition for demonstratives get 'neutralized', but there might be something to say in favor of the point-of-view explanation. If I am indicating a sore tooth when talking to a dentist I can say either "It's this one" or "It's that one." I have the feeling that the second of these acknowledges the addressee's point of view.

I once even thought that a way of testing this hypothesis could be devised in connection with a non-linguistic analog of the point-of-view problem, namely the choice of ways in which we can indicate to somebody that there's a smudge on his face.

Suppose I have a smudge on my left cheek. Some people in telling me about it will point to their left cheek, others will point to their right cheek. The latter are regarding themselves as mirrors and are taking my point of view -- or so I thought, anyway. (It may be that they're just having the left/right problem that some people, especially very young children, have in face-to-face interaction.) Anyway, what I thought was that if people tell me about a smudge on my left cheek by pointing to their right cheek they would be more inclined to say

"It's right there" than "It's right here", and that people who tell me about it by pointing to their left cheek would be more likely to say "It's right here." Not only do I no longer have much confidence in the hypothesis, but I am unwilling to carry out the experiment. One way of doing it, one might think, is to go around, pointing to one's left cheek, and telling some people "You have a smudge right here" and telling other people "You have a smudge right there" and notice which cheek they decide to wipe off. The approach doesn't work, because men, and women who don't wear makeup, simply rub their hands over both cheeks, and women who wear makeup go to the ladies' room. The other way to conduct the experiment would be to walk around with a dirty face and see whether people will talk to me about it; but naturally I'm unwilling to do that.

As I mentioned earlier, other places to look for information about requirements on social contexts for linguistic performance is in the description of the various types of speech acts -- such things as greeting, apologizing, insulting, promising, and giving thanks. There is no end to the examples one could give, but just to illustrate the sorts of problems that might come up, let's consider greetings and thanks.

English has a number of time-of-day greetings, and these can be specified according to whether they can be conversation-initiating (like "good morning") or conversation-terminating (like "good night") and the like. In a number of other languages, the greeting patterns reflect more sorts of social realities. A typical Zapotec pattern is one by which, when meeting somebody outdoors, one says either "Where are you going?" or "Where have you been?". Notice that in order to know how to perform a greeting in this language, you have to know where the person you are addressing lives -- because only then can you know whether he's walking toward his home ("Where have you been?") or away from his home ("Where are you going?"). In the Mixe dialect studied by John and Shirley Lyons, when you meet somebody outdoors you notice whether the person is older than you or younger. If he's younger, forget it, because he'll greet you. If he's older, you notice whether he's walking uphill, downhill, or on a level. When he reaches the appropriate distance you say, say, "You are going uphill". When somebody comes to your house, you have to know where his house is, in respect to yours, in order to welcome him, because the way to welcome somebody to your home is to say "You have come downhill" or "You have come uphill" or the like.

For expressions of gratitude, let's consider just the two English expressions "Thank you" and "You're welcome". In English, but not in all languages, it is appropriate to express thanks when somebody has made a gift, performed a favor, given praise, or made

an inquiry into one's health. In some languages the equivalent expression is much more limited, and in many languages one would not say "Thank you" on being praised or commended.

The response "You're welcome" is sometimes described as a kind of conditioned response to the linguistic stimulus "Thank you", but it is actually nothing of the sort. It is appropriate to say "You're welcome" when you have been thanked for a gift or a favor, but not when being thanked for praise or an inquiry into one's health and happiness. For example, if he says to her, "You have very lovely legs" and she says "Why, thank you", he does not then say "You're welcome". If she says to him "How's your wife?" and he says "Much better, thank you", she does not then say "You're welcome".

(Incidentally, this is good to keep in mind when arguing with a behaviorist. It's common, when challenged to think of one thing which can be thought of as being a linguistic response to a purely linguistic stimulus, for the example of "You're welcome" to come up. Examples like those I just mentioned ought to convince your opponent that "You're welcome" is not an instance of a one-step conditioned response.)

This is the last of the lectures that I have had time to write up. The main other topics I would like to have included are the relation between direct discourse and indirect discourse, as this relation depends on matters of the deictic anchoring of the quoted and the quoting sentences; the logic of deictic (indexical) sentences; and the small number of independently motivated principles of case grammar from which all of the observations I have made in these lectures can be convincingly explained. I regret these omissions, but time is my enemy.

I've written these lectures up mainly in the hope of getting questions, new examples, corrections, better wisecracks, and the like. I would not like the apparently substantive remarks I've made here to be quoted, especially where there are references to exotic languages, because in most cases I haven't been able to check my sources, in a few cases I feel I might have misunderstood what I was told, and in at least one case (the case that got crossed out in most copies of the Deixis I lecture) what I said was completely wrong. The lectures should be thought of as a list of possible dissertation or term paper or squib topics. Anyway, thanks for listening to me.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

There isn't a great deal to read on the subject of deixis. The main general discussions in the linguistic literature are Henri Frei (1944), "Systèmes de déictiques," Acta linguistica 4.111-129; Roman Jakobson (1957), "Shifters, verbal categories, and the Russian verb," mimeo, Russian Language Project, Harvard University, esp. pp. 1-5 [fairly unobtainable; it appears in French translation as chapter 9 of Essais de linguistique générale (1963), Paris: Les Editions de Minuit]; Uriel Weinreich (1963), "On the semantic structures of language," in Joseph H. Greenberg, ed., Universals of language, MIT Press, esp. pp. 123-127; Charles J. Fillmore (1966), "Deictic categories in the semantics of 'come'," Word 19.208-231; and John Lyons (1968), Introduction to theoretical linguistics, Cambridge Press, pp. 275-281. In the psychological literature the only discussions of deixis that I know of are Karl Bühler (1934), Sprachtheorie, Jena, esp. pp. 79-148; and Ragnar Rommetveit (1968), Words, meanings and messages: theory and experiments in psycholinguistics, Academic Press, passim, but esp. pp. 51-54 and 185-197. Easiest access to the philosophical issues connected with deixis is provided by Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1954), "Indexical expressions," Mind 63:359-379; Arthur W. Burks (1948-9), "Icon, index and symbol," Philosophy and phenomenological research 9.673-689; and Richard M. Gale (1967), "Indexical signs, egocentric particulars, and token-reflexive words," The encyclopedia of philosophy, Macmillan, 4.151-155. This last includes a discussion, with references, of the positions of Bertrand Russell, C. S. Peirce, and Hans Reichenbach. The Burks article is an exegesis of Peirce.